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Perhaps the sentiments contained in the following pages, are not yet sufficiently 
fashionable to procure them general favor; a long habit of not thinking a thing 
wrong, gives it a superficial appearance of being right, and raises at first a formi-
dable outcry in defense of custom. But the tumult soon subsides.1 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a conundrum that faces persons that seek to evaluate Con-
gress's authority to preempt a state tax. It cannot be the case that the U.S. 
Congress has unfettered authority to preempt state taxes pursuant to the U.S. 
Constitution's Commerce Clause. This is because the federal government 
and the state governments are separate sovereigns under the U.S. Constitu-
tion/ and the power to tax is a fundamental aspect of governmental sover-
eignty.3 Further, such unlimited authority is inconsistent with the purpose 
and meaning of the Commerce Clause as it has been construed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court starting with its earliest cases and running through its more 
recent federalism cases.4 Yet, such preemptions, which began slightly more 
than a half-century ago,5 have become more frequent in recent years,6 and 
I. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE ix (Peter Eckler Publishing Co. 1918). 
2. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. Ports Auth., 531 U.S. 743, 751 (2002) 
("Dual sovereignty is a defining feature of our Nation's constitutional blueprint."); Printz v. 
Untied States, 932 U.S. 898, 932 (1997) (referring to the "structural framework of [the coun-
try's] dual sovereignty"); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 510 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1991) (listing 
some of the advantages "to the people" of the "federalist structure of joint sovereigns"); 
Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) (similar). 
3. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Farm Credit Servs. of Cent. Ark., 520 U.S. 821, 826 
(1997) (stating "[t]he power to tax is basic to the power of the State to exist"; and the "[t]he 
States' interest in the integrity of their own processes is of particular moment respecting 
questions of state taxation"); Dep't of Revenue of Or. v. ACF Indus., 510 U.S. 332, 345 
(1994) (the power to tax is "central to state sovereignty"); Bode v. Barrett, 344 U.S. 583, 585 
(1953) ("The power of a state to tax [is] basic to its sovereignty."); Curry v. McCanless, 307 
U.S. 357, 366 (1939) (the state power to tax is "incident of' and "coextensive with" sover-
eignty); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199 (1824) ("The power of taxation is 
indispensible to [the states'] existence."). In the recent "dormant" Commerce Clause case, 
Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, 533 U.S. 328, 341-42 (2008), the Supreme 
Court singled out state bond issuances as something beyond a mere "traditional government 
function," terming such issuances as a "quintessentially public function" that serves to 
"shoulder the cardinal civic responsibilities ... protecting the health, safety and welfare of 
citizens." The imposition of state taxes shoulders similar responsibilities and is at least as 
vital. See Dows v. Chicago, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 108, 110 (1870) ("It is upon taxation that the 
several States chiefly rely to obtain the means to carry on their respective governments."). 
4. See infra Parts I, II. 
5. See 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1959). The Act's primary application is to preempt the 
imposition of a state's net income tax as applied to a corporation engaged in the sale of tan-
gible personal property when that corporation limits its in-state connection to the solicitation 
of such sales and the delivery of the property from a point located outside the state. See id; 
see also H.R. REP. No. 88-1480, at 8 (1964) (stating that with the Act, "Congress had for the 
first time exercised its power over interstate commerce to enact a general statute dealing with 
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the volume of federal bills proposing such preemptions have recently multi-
plied, fostered by the fact that there are no established applicable judicial 
limitations. Indeed, each year the prospect for Congressional preemption of 
state taxes seems to become greater; in 2011, at least eight such bills, which 
would broadly preempt various state income and sales taxes, were intro-
duced in Congress.7 Moreover, two of those bills were quickly voted on 
favorably by the relevant Congressional committee, and one of those two 
bills was subsequently passed by the House of Representatives. 8 
state taxation of interstate businesses."); Kathryn Moore, State and Local Taxation: When 
Will Congress Intervene, 23 J. LEGIS. 171, 182 (1997) ("Congress has introduced bills regu-
lating state and local taxation as far back as 1934 yet did not actually enact any legislation 
limiting the States' power to tax interstate commerce until [the enactment of Public Law 86-
272 in] 1959."). 
6. See Joseph Henchman, Tax Foundation Calls for Curbing 'Aggressive' Nexus 
Standards, ST. TAX TODAY, Apr. 14, 2011, at 72-8 (Congressional testimony of Joseph 
Henchman referencing twenty federal acts that have preempted state taxes); Walter Heller-
stein, University of Georgia Law Professor Testifies in Support of H.R. 3359, ST. TAX 
TODAY, Nov. 2, 2007, at 213-5 (Congressional testimony of Professor Walter Hellerstein 
referencing recent state tax preemption statutes). 
7. The 20 II bills include a bill that would extend the preemption of 15 U.S.C. § 
381, see supra note 5, to fact patterns and taxes not previously covered, see the Business 
Activity Tax Simplification Act of2011, H.R. 1439, I 12th Cong. (2011), as well as bills that 
would preempt: (I) the "discriminatory" taxation of mobile services, mobile service provid-
ers, and mobile service providers on a "moratorium basis," the Wireless Tax Fairness Act of 
2011, H.R. 1002, !12th Cong. (2011), S. 543, !12th Cong. (2011); (2) the "discriminatory" 
taxation of the sale of digital goods and services, the Digital Goods and Services Tax Fair-
ness Act of 2011, H.R. 1860, !12th Cong. (2011), S. 971, !12th Cong. (2011); (3) the "dis-
criminatory" state taxation of car rentals, the End Discriminatory State Taxes for Automobile 
Renters Act of 2011, H.R. 2469, !12th Cong. (2011); (4) the "discriminatory" taxation of 
video distribution, the State Video Tax Fairness Act, H.R. 1804, !12th Cong. (2011); (5) 
personal income tax imposed on short-term transient workers, the Mobile Workforce State 
Income Tax Simplification Act of 2011, H.R. 1864, !12th Cong. (2011); and (6) personal 
income tax imposed on nonresident telecommuters, the Telecommuter Tax Fairness Act of 
20 II, S. 1811, !12th Con g. (20 II). Also, an eighth bill would make permanent the previous-
ly enacted 1998 "moratorium" on "discriminatory" taxes as applied to Internet access charg-
es and related fees, the Permanent Internet Tax Freedom Act of 20 II, S. 135, I 12th Con g. 
(20 II). The original version of the latter law, which has been extended three times, was the 
Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1998), which is currently on extension to 2014. 
See Internet Tax Freedom Act Amendments Act of2007, Pub. L. No. 110-108, 121 Stat. 
1 024 (2007). 
8. See supra note 7 (referencing the eight 2011 Congressional bills). The recent bill 
to expand Public Law 86-272 was approved by the full House Judiciary Committee without a 
Subcommittee vote. See John Buhl, House Judiciary Committee Passes BAT Nexus Bill, ST. 
TAX TODAY, July 8, 2011, at 131-1. Then, within days, the same subcommittee approved the 
"moratorium" on "discriminatory" state wireless taxes. See Simon Brown, U.S. House Com-
mittee Approves Moratorium on 'Discriminatory' Wireless Taxes, ST. TAX TODAY, July 15, 
2011, at 136-2. Subsequently, the wireless bill was passed by the full House of Representa-
tives on a voice vote. See John Buhl, House Approves Moratorium on New Wireless Taxes, 
ST. TAX TODAY, Nov. 2, 2011, at 212-2. 
44 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2012:41 
The Framers of the Constitution who established our nation's system 
of dual sovereignty would no doubt be surprised by the Congressional activ-
ity preempting state taxes. The Framers considered the imposition of a state 
tax to be perhaps the most vital of the states' sovereign functions.9 Indeed, 
even Alexander Hamilton, a staunch supporter of federal power, and of 
commerce generally, explicitly suggested that there are limitations on Con-
gress's power to preempt a state tax when he stated in the Federalist Papers 
that "the individual states would, under the proposed Constitution, retain an 
independent and uncontrollable authority to raise revenue to any extent of 
which they may need, by every kind of taxation, except duties on imports 
and exports."10 Hamilton also stated that: 
Though, a law, therefore, for laying a tax for the use of the United States would be 
supreme in its nature, and could not legally be opposed or controlled, yet a law for 
abrogating or preventing the collection of a tax laid by the authority of the States 
(unless upon imports and exports) would not be the supreme law of the land, but a 
usurpation of power not granted by the Constitution. 11 
The U.S. Supreme Court has in recent years emphasized our nation's 
dual sovereignty structure and the Framers' intentions as embodied in the 
Constitution in crafting rules to protect the states from federal overreaching 
in various contexts under the Constitution, including with respect to the 
Commerce Clause. 12 Some of those latter Commerce Clause limitations are 
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 173 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
I 0. !d.; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 32, supra note 9, at 165-66 (Alexander Hamil-
ton) (acknowledging "the justness of the reasoning which requires that the individual States 
should possess an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise their own revenues for 
the supply of their wants"). 
II. THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supra note 9, at 173 (Alexander Hamilton). 
12. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011) (concluding that an 
individual has standing under the Tenth Amendment to argue that a federal law improperly 
intruded upon an area of "police power" reserved to the states); United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down a federal law enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause 
that would have provided a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-based violence); Alden 
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (striking down under the Tenth Amendment a federal law that 
authorized a private suit against a non-consenting state for money damages in state court); 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking down a federal law enacted pursuant to 
the Commerce Clause that required state police to perform background checks and other 
activities in connection with gun purchases); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) 
(striking down a federal law enacted under Article 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment on the 
grounds that the law was disproportionate in its effects compared to its objective); Seminole 
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (striking down under the Eleventh Amendment a 
federal law that authorized a private suit against a state in federal court); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down a federal law enacted under the Commerce 
Clause that sought to make it a federal offense for an individual to knowingly possess a 
firearm at a place that the individual knows or has reasonable cause to know is a school 
zone). 
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now the subject of a national debate among persons considering the consti-
tutionality of the recently-enacted federal health care bill. 13 However, the 
Court has not yet posited any rules to protect the states from federal 
preemptions in the state tax area. The lack of any stated judicial standards 
emboldens supporters of state tax preemptions who conclude that the cur-
rent absence of stated limitations indicates that there are no such limita-
tions.14 Consequently, the lack of judicial standards acts to the detriment of 
the states, which are unable to point to such limits when seeking to fend off 
Congressional action. 
This Article advances from the common sense notion that, given the 
nation's dual sovereignty structure and the intended meaning of the Com-
merce Clause, there must be meaningful limitations on Congress's ability to 
preempt a state tax. The Article concludes that in general the Commerce 
Clause confers upon Congress two basic powers: ( 1) the power to prevent 
states from engaging in discrimination that would inure to the benefit of 
local commercial interests and other forms of state-based economic protec-
tionism, which is a power consistent with the clear intention made express 
by the Constitutional Framers at the time of the drafting of the Constitution, 
and (2) a general power to regulate private commercial activity as literally 
referenced in the Commerce Clause by the statement that "Congress shall 
have the power ... to regulate commerce ... among the several states."15 
13. The Patient, Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010; Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
124 Stat. 119 (20 10). 
14. See Henchman, supra note 6, at 72-8 (stating at a 2011 Congressional hearing 
that the "Constitution ... empowers you, the Congress, to restrain states from enacting laws 
that harm the national economy by discriminating against interstate commerce," noting that 
"[t]his is a power that you have exercised in past situations where preempting state taxation 
furthered that national economic interest," and then citing twenty instances where Congress 
preempted a state tax); Amy Hamilton, Governors Urge Congress to Oppose BAT Nexus · 
Legislation, ST. TAX TODAY, Aug. 5, 2011, at 151-1 ("[S]ince 1789, the regula-
tion--including the taxation-of interstate commerce 'has clearly been the responsibility of 
Congress, and Congress has exercised that authority more than a dozen times ... in the con-
text of interstate commerce.'") (quoting comments of Arthur Rosen). 
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. A similar two-part method of inquiry applied to 
Constitutional interpretation, focused on "text and principle," i.e., the meaning of the text and 
the underlying purposes for the text, has been suggested by Professor Balkin. See Jack M. 
Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REv. I, I (2010); see also Robert H. Bork & Daniel E. 
Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of Congress's Power to Regulate Commerce, 25 
HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 849, 852 (2002) (stating that the text of the Commerce Clause "was 
designed to empower Congress to regulate trade between and among the States" and that 
"[g]iven the text and purpose behind the Clause, Congress certainly has the power, at a min-
imum, to displace state laws that discriminate against interstate commerce, either explicitly 
or implicitly"); Brannon P. Denning, Is the Dormant Commerce Clause Expendable? A 
Response to Edward Zelinsky, 77 MISS. L.J. 623, 634 (2007) (stating that a "core purpose" of 
the Commerce Clause along with the "explicit textual provisions" was to "inhibit that sort of 
commercial predation, which invited, and often resulted in, recrimination and retaliation 
among neighboring states"). 
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As to the former power to limit economic protectionism, this Article 
concludes that Congress has broad power, but that it acts outside the scope 
of this power when it preempts a state tax that does not reflect economic 
protectionism. Most of the recently proposed Congressional preemptions 
fall into this latter category, as they purport to preempt state taxes as applied 
to a specific industry merely on the theory that state taxes apply more heavi-
ly to that industry-i.e., a supposed "discrimination" as between types of 
industries-and not because the state is favoring in-state commercial inter-
ests.16 Indeed, in several of the recently proposed preemption bills, reference 
is made to a purported "discrimination" as between industries when in fact 
there is not even "discrimination" of this type. 17 
Apart from the power imparted to Congress to police economic pro-
tectionism, the literal language set forth in the Commerce Clause, which 
empowers Congress "to regulate commerce ... among the several states,"18 
affords Congress no obvious ability to preempt a state tax at all. The impo-
sition of state taxation is not an act of "commerce."19 Persons who support 
16. See supra note 7 (generally referencing these recently-proposed Congressional 
bills). For example, the bill with respect to digital goods is predicated on the claim that the 
states tax digital goods "differently from their tangible counterparts." See John Buhl, Con-
gressional Witnesses Debate Value of Framework for State Taxation of Digital Goods, ST. 
TAX TODAY, May 24, 2011, at 100-2. Also, the wireless bill defines a discriminatory tax as 
"a tax that is imposed only on mobile services, or is imposed at a higher rate on mobile ser-
vices than other types of services." See Simon Brown, House Committee Approves Morato-
rium on "Discriminatory" Wireless Taxes, ST. TAX TODAY, July 15, 2011, at 136-2. And, the 
rental car bill is intended to address the fact that there are taxes imposed as to rental cars that 
are not imposed as to the rental of other types of tangible personal property. See End Dis-
criminatory State Taxes for Automobile Renters Act of 2011, H.R. 2469, I 12th Cong. 
(2011). Another example is the previously enacted, thrice renewed, Internet Tax Freedom 
Act of 1998, which is directed in part at "discrimination" in state taxes that is, supposedly, 
unique to that industry. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1998). Also, the video bill focuses on "discrimina-
tory taxes" imposed on satellite TV providers that are not imposed upon cable TV providers. 
See State Video Tax Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1804, I 12th Cong. (2011). The industry 
pushing the latter bill has also attempted to claim similar discrimination in court proceedings. 
See DIRECTV v. Levin, 941 N.E.2d 1187, 1194 (Ohio 2010) (finding against the industry 
because "differential tax treatment of 'two categories of companies result[ing] solely from 
differences between the nature of their businesses, [and] not from the location of their activi-
ties, does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause."' (quoting Ameranda Hess Corp. v. 
Director, Div. of Taxation, N.J. Dep't of Treasury, 490 U.S. 66, 78 (1989))); see also 
DIRECTV v. North Carolina, 632 S.E.2d 543, 545 (N.C. 2006) (similar); DIRECTV v. 
Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 481 (6th Cir. 2007)(similar). 
17. See, e.g., Russ Brubaker, Federation of Tax Administrators Rep Testifies Against 
Digital Goods Tax Bill, ST. TAX TODAY, May 24, 2011, at 100-5 (comments of Russ Bru-
baker, Tax Policy Adviser with the Washington Department of Revenue) (noting that there is 
no evidence that the States tax digital goods less favorably than the sale of other goods and 
that therefore a Congressional preemption as to such taxes on this basis is unwarranted). 
18. U.S. CONST. art I,§ 8, cl. 3. 
19. Cf U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 3; see generally Balkin, supra note 15, at 15-29 
(discussing the intended meaning of the term "commerce" in the Commerce Clause); Bork & 
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state tax preemption generally assume that the Commerce power broadly 
allows Congress to preempt state taxes on the theory that state taxation indi-
rectly impacts commerce,2° but the Commerce Clause literally allows Con-
gress only to regulate commerce itself and the Tenth Amendment makes 
express what is generally implied in the Constitution, that powers that are 
not delegated to the Congress are reserved to the states. 21 
In some cases, the states function as commercial actors and thereby 
compete with commerce. The Congressional ability to regulate the states 
under the Commerce Clause even in this context has proven controversial 
through the years, though the cases now generally conclude that Congress 
can regulate state activity when it is the equivalent of private commercial 
activity.22 However, the imposition of a state tax is not the equivalent of a 
private commercial activity, but rather is a unique attribute of government.23 
Troy, supra note 15, at 861-64 (same); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the 
Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 111-32 (2001) (same); GrantS. Nelson & Robert 
P. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Fed-
eral Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. 
REV. I, 13-42 (I 999) (same). By way of contrast, the challenges to the recent federal health 
care bill are predicated primarily on the claim that the private behavior regulated by the bill, 
the "non-purchase" of health insurance, is not "commerce," and therefore is not subject to 
Commerce Clause regulation. See Brief for Private Plaintiffs-Appellees National Federation 
of Independent Business, Kaj Ahlburg & Mary Brown at 15, Florida ex rei. Atty. Gen. v. 
U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (lith Cir. 2011) (No. 11-11021). 
20. See, e.g., Hellerstein, supra note 6 ("There should be no serious controversy 
over Congress's broad authority to adopt virtually any rule [preempting state taxes] that it 
believes is appropriate with respect to matters that substantially affect interstate com-
merce."). 
21. The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "[t]he powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend X. This Amend-
ment "expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a 
fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal 
system." Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975); see also Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 
898, 919 (1997) (stating that the Tenth Amendment makes "express" that there is "[r]esidual 
state sovereignty"). 
22. See, e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (holding that the Driver's Priva-
cy Protection Act is a proper exercise of Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause); 
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (holding that the Internal Revenue Code's 
provision denying a federal income tax exemption for interest earned on unregistered long-
term state and local government bonds does not violate the Tenth Amendment); Wirtz v. 
Maryland, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (holding that the 1966 amendments to the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act are constitutional), rev'd by Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 
(I 976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985). 
23. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946) (plurality opinion) 
(Frankfurter, J.) (case allowing Congress to impose tax on state sales of state mineral water, 
but noting in dicta that the federal government cannot tax state tax revenues because such 
action would constitute "taxing the State as a State," and that further the federal government 
can tax private commercial ventures, but unlike private commercial ventures, "only a State 
can get income by taxing"); see also id. at 588 (Stone, C.J., concurring) (explaining that, 
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In most of the decided cases that have evaluated Congress's ability to 
regulate commercial activity under the Commerce Clause, beginning with 
Gibbons v. Ogden in 1824,24 the essential issue has been whether the object 
of the regulation in question is reserved to the states, reserved to Congress, 
or to be shared by some combination thereof. 25 That history of cases has 
through the course of time channeled much of the nation's regulatory activi-
ty into the third classification of federal-state "concurrent jurisdiction," 
where, the cases have determined, Congressional power is supreme.26 But 
state taxation cannot be evaluated under this analysis because the taxing 
power of the states is not a concurrent power; only a state can impose a state 
tax. 27 
Before proceeding to the crux of the argument, there are two threshold 
points that warrant consideration. First, it is sometimes suggested that argu-
ably-intrusive Congressional activity taken pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause is subject to the general restrictions protecting the states that arise 
from the operation of the national political process.28 The federal health care 
pill, which has incited strong feelings on the part of the populace for and 
against federal-as opposed to state-regulation, is an example of this dy-
namic.29 However, the national political process does not operate as an ef-
fective safeguard in the realm of Congressional attempts to preempt state 
taxes. Unlike in the instance of the health care bill, which directly affects 
individuals' lives, most persons are generally unaware of Congressional 
unlike the states, "private citizens do not own State-houses or public school buildings or 
receive tax revenues .... ");United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. 
Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 342-43 (2007) ("Unlike private enterprise, government is vested with 
the responsibility of protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens .... These im-
portant responsibilities set state and local govemm~nt apart from a typical private busi-
ness."). 
24. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
25. Gibbons recognized that there would be times when federal or state legislative 
acts would pose no conflict as to one another but that there would also be times when a state 
would be "regulat[ing] commerce ... among the several States ... [and thereby be] exercis-
ing the very power that is granted to Congress, and is doing the very thing which Congress is 
authorized to do." See id. at 199-200; see also infra Section I. B. 
26. See infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
27. See New York, 326 U.S. at 582. 
28. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 544-45 
(1985). 
29. See, e.g., Rebecca E. Zietlow, Democratic Constitutionalism and the Affordable 
Care Act, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1367, 1367-68 (2011) (noting that "[d]uring the congressional 
debate over the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), opponents of the 
Act mounted dramatic demonstrations against it" and "Tea Party activists attacked the ACA 
as an unconstitutional infringement on states' rights and individual liberty") (citations omit-
ted); Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-Based Dissent to 
Federal Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. Ill, 113-14 (2010) (noting numerous efforts in 
the aftermath of the passage of the Act on the part of the states and their citizens to nullify 
the application of the law including several ballot initiatives). 
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activity with respect to state taxes, and the implications thereof.30 Indeed, to 
the extent persons are aware of state tax preemptions they generally per-
ceive such actions not as a strike against our nation's constitutional design, 
but rather as a measure in which their federal legislators are providing them 
with a tax break-albeit one as to their state rather than their federal taxes. 
Federal legislators can placate the business lobby group that requested the 
preemption31 and take credit for such tax "cuts,'032 though they themselves 
are not responsible for the state budgets that will either need to make corre-
sponding cuts to state services or to replace the taxes preempted with taxes 
of some other type.33 
30. Professor Jerome R. Hellerstein has noted that proposed legislation concerning 
state multistate taxation is "too technical and complex to excite public interest," and that 
therefore "the issues can be easily obfuscated by the public relations arms of the various 
interested groups." Jerome R. Hellerstein, State Taxation Under the Commerce Clause: An 
Historical Perspective, 29 V AND. L. REv. 335, 351 (1976). The result is that "federal legisla-
tion that may emerge may be determined more by the sheer political muscle of the groups 
with a direct stake in the matter than by a rational resolution of the legitimate positions of the 
state and local governments, multistate business, and its local competitors." Id. 
31. See Moore, supra note 5, at 204 (noting that "[t]he empirical evidence suggests 
that Congress may enact legislation regulating discrete instances of state and local taxation of 
interstate commerce if the legislation [among other things]. .. will benefit a specific, well-
defined interest group that orchestrates an extensive campaign with limited opposition."); 
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 575 n.18 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[W]e have witnessed in recent 
years the rise of numerous special interest groups that engage in sophisticated lobbying, and 
make substantial campaign contributions to some Members of Congress .... groups [that] are 
thought to have significant influence in the shaping and enactment of certain types of legisla-
tion[;] ... a 'political process' that functions in this way is unlikely to safeguard the sover-
eign interest of States and localities."); see also supra note 30 (quoting Jerome R. Heller-
stein). 
32. See Brian Galle, The Politics of Federalism: Self-Interest or Safeguards? Evi-
dence from Congressional Control of State Taxation 7 (Boston College Law Sch. Legal 
Studies Research, Paper No. 220, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=l75951 0 (noting that "a congressional 
decision to prohibit certain state taxes would appear to have the exact political structure of 
any other unfunded mandate: the state loses money, while Congress can take political credit 
with the affected interest group"); Tracy A. Kaye, Show Me the Money: Congressional Limi-
tations on State Tax Sovereignty, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 149, 178 (1998) (noting the incentive 
for Congress to provide constituents "with tax giveaways in the form of prohibitions on state 
taxation"). 
33. Cf Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932 (1997) (evaluating a federal law 
requiring state officials to perform background checks on purchasers of handguns; critiquing 
the law as one that tends to "direct the functioning of the state executive and hence to com-
promise the structural framework of [our nation's] dual sovereignty"); Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706, 751 (1999) (evaluating a federal law creating a private right of action against a 
state in state court) ("When the Federal Government asserts authority over a State's most 
fundamental political processes, it strikes at the heart of the political accountability so essen-
tial to our liberty and republican form of government."); id. at 750-51 (stating the law would 
be inconsistent with the Constitution because, among other things, of the drain that the law 
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Second, persons who support the preemption of state tax frequently 
claim that the amount of preempted state taxes at stake is not large and 
therefore not worthy of legal concem.34 However, this argument misses the 
point that if the nature of the congressional act is unauthorized, its magni-
tude does not matter. 35 Moreover, the dollar cost of the various state tax 
preemptions in sum to date is certainly quite large and ever-growing.36 In-
deed, the very nature of a preempted tax is that once the tax is preempted, 
the potential cost of that preemption grows progressively more difficult to 
ascertain, in part because the provisions of the law remain static but the 
transactions that qualify for preemption are potentially in flux.37 As Profes-
could place on the states' treasuries preventing "the States' ability to govern in accordance 
with the will of their citizens"). 
34. See, e.g., Amy Hamilton, Governors Urge Congress to Oppose BAT Nexus 
Legislation, ST. TAX TODAY, Aug. 4, 2011, at 151-1 (noting the comments of a supporter of 
the 2011 proposed Congressional bill that would expand the application of Public Law 86-
272, justifying the bill in part on the theory that the expanded provisions would apply only to 
de minimis activity). 
35. As former Justice Powell has written: 
[T]he harm to the States that results from federal overreaching under the Com-
merce Clause is not simply a matter of dollars and cents. Nor is it a matter of the 
wisdom or folly of certain policy choices. Rather, by usurping functions tradition-
ally performed by the States, federal overreaching under the Commerce Clause un-
dermines the constitutionally mandated balance of power between the States and 
the Federal Government, a balance designed to protect our fundamentalliberttes. 
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 572 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
36. To take just one example, there are no recent estimates as to the cost to the states 
of Public Law 86-272, which preempts the state taxation of net income of a corporation that 
limits its in-state activity to the solicitation of the sale of tangible personal property where 
the delivery of such property is from a point located outside the state. See 15 U.S.C. § 381 
(1959). However, a recent study by the Congressional Budget Office suggested the magni-
tude of the cost of that Jaw when it estimated that the cost of extending the protections of that 
law to the sale of similar services would cost the states $2 billion annually beginning in the 
first year of application--five percent of the state collections from corporate income tax-
es--and "at least that amount in subsequent years." CBO Estimates Cost of Business Activity 
Tax Simplification Legislation, ST. TAX TODAY, Sept. 15, 2011, at 179-3; see also Michael T. 
Fatale, Federalism and State Business Activity Tax Nexus: Revisiting Public Law 86-272, 21 
VA. TAX REV. 435, 439 n.15 (2002) (noting that "[a]n affidavit filed by the Massachusetts 
Department of Revenue in a 1997 case stated that, for the fiscal years 1993 and 1994, the 
Department assessed taxes or sent notices of intention to assess in 1,580 cases in which tax-
payers invoked [the protection of] Public Law 86-272, representing taxes that totaled 
$29,578,207); see also supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
37. See Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1998). The Internet tax "mora-
torium," originally enacted in 1998, but subsequently extended three times and now about to 
enter its fourteenth year, provides an example of this phenomenon. That Jaw initially applied 
only to transactions to log on to the Internet but later, by virtue of the statutory language, also 
applied to charges for "mobile device data plans," transactions that did not exist at the time 
the law was enacted. This latter fact, and the fact that the states were slow to amend their 
practices to apply the federal law to evolving technology, resulted in a successful class action 
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sor Lawrence Tribe has succinctly stated, the danger "lies in the tyranny of 
small decisions-in the prospect that Congress will nibble away at state 
sovereignty, bit by bit, until someday essentially nothing is left but a gutted 
shell."38 
This Article evaluates the Commerce Clause using a historical ap-
proach. It proceeds by first evaluating the Commerce Clause generally, in-
cluding consideration of both the affirmative and "dormant" Commerce 
Clause. This first Section evaluates the purposes that underlie the Com-
merce Clause and considers Congress's ability to preempt state taxes that 
reflect economic protectionism or discrimination in favor of local commer-
cial interests consistent with these purposes.39 The second Section evaluates 
Congress's more general textual power to regulate "commerce . . . among 
the several states" and considers what ability, if any, this section confers 
upon Congress to preempt a state tax.40 Lastly, the Article considers some 
prior Congressional preemptions of state taxes and dicta in some recent U.S. 
Supreme Court cases and evaluates what if anything those developments 
portend with respect to future Constitutional doctrine as it relates to state tax 
preemptions. 41 
I. THE ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLE REFLECTED IN 
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
The history of the Commerce Clause reveals an intention that Con-
gress be authorized to police state acts of economic protectionism. Moreo-
ver, the history suggests sensitivity to the performance by the states of inte-
gral and traditional governmental activities, including specifically what may 
be the most integral and traditional government act, the imposition of a state 
tax.42 This history tracks through the primary purpose for the Commerce 
Clause, the construction accorded to the Clause in the Supreme Court's ear-
liest cases, and the Court's current understanding of the purposes that un-
derlie the Clause as articulated in the Court's recent "dormant" Commerce 
Clause cases. 
for over one billion dollars in sales tax refunds in 2011. See In re AT&T Mobility Wireless 
Data Servs. Sales Tax Litig., 789 F. Supp. 2d 935 (N.D. Ill. 2011). 
38. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 381 (2d ed. 1988) 
(speaking with respect to Congressional preemptions of state law in general) (quoted in 
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 533 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)). 
39. See infra Part I. 
40. See infra Part II. 
41. See infra Part III. 
42. See supra notes 3, 9-11; see also infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Adoption of the Commerce Clause 
In part to address concerns about the states' protectionist activities, the 
U.S. Constitution was adopted in place of the Articles of Confederation, 
which was the preliminary document that governed the operations of the 
United States after its victory in the Revolutionary War. In the absence of 
British rule, "uncertainty and retaliatory trade barriers began to spread 
among the States."43 The political effect of the increasing tension between 
the various states led some persons, including Alexander Hamilton, to con-
clude that unregulated trade warfare would turn to interstate war.44 Problem-
atically, Congress "lacked the power to prepare a coherent response to inter-
state squabbles" and moreover was unable '"to frame and implement satis-
factory foreign policies. "'45 
The U.S. Constitution was drafted in 1787 and became effective after 
it was ratified by a sufficient number of states the following year.46 The 
Commerce Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution, ad-
dressed a perceived deficiency in the Articles of Confederation, stating 
simply that Congress shall have power to "regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."47 The 
Constitution included in Article I, Section 8, Clause 18, an additional provi-
sion, the "Necessary and Proper Clause," which states that "Congress shall 
have [the] power ... to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper 
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers."48 
Two years after the ratification of the Constitution, in 1791, the Bill of 
Rights was adopted as a series of amendments to the Constitution.49 These 
amendments were being contemplated at the time that the Constitution was 
being ratified, and the prospect of these amendments encouraged some 
states to ratify the Constitution. 5° Included in the Bill of Rights is the Tenth 
Amendment, which states that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United 
43. Bork & Troy, supra note 15, at 855. 
44. /d. 
45. !d. at 857 (quoting JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS 
IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 26 (1996)). 
46. See Constitution of the United States: A History, THE U.S. NAT'L ARCHIVES & 
RECORDS ADMIN., http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution _ history.html (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2012). 
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
49. See Constitution of the United States, supra note 46. 
50. See Bill of Rights, THE U.S. NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/bill_of_rights.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2012) (not-
ing that "[ s ]everal state conventions in their formal ratification of the Constitution asked for 
such amendments; others ratified the Constitution with the understanding that the amend-
ments would be offered"). 
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States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people."51 
The Tenth Amendment confirms the rights of the states as separate 
sovereigns, although even apart from that provision, "[ d]ual sovereignty is a 
defining feature of[the] Nation's constitutional blueprint."52 As James Mad-
ison wrote in the Federalist Papers, prior to becoming the primary author of 
the Bill of Rights, states entered the nation with "'residuary and inviolable 
sovereignty. "'53 Madison wrote also that: 
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are 
few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous 
and indefinite .... The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the 
objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and 
properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the 
State. 54 
The Constitutional Framers-notably Alexander Hamilton, a strong 
proponent of federal power and of commerce generally-also expressed the 
particular view that the federal government could not act to abridge the 
states' sovereign ability to impose taxes. 55 
Although the literal language of the Commerce Clause does not ex-
press a specific concern as to protectionist acts by the states, there is no 
doubt that providing the means to address such acts was the Framers' pri-
mary intention as expressed in that clause. 56 Statements to this effect are 
made throughout the Federalist Papers, through which Hamilton, Madison, 
and John Jay sought to muster support and ultimately ratification for the 
recently authored Constitution.57 For example, Hamilton in Number 22 stat-
51. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
52. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002); see also su-
pra note 2. 
53. See Fed. Mar. Comm 'n, 535 U.S. at 751; Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 
919 (1997); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (all quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, 
supra note 9, at 245 (James Madison)). 
54. Gregory v. Aschroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1991) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 
45, supra note 9, at 292-93 (James Madison)). 
55. See THE FEDERALIST No. 32, supra note 9, at 199-201 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(stating that the taxing power of the States under the U.S. Constitution, save for imports or 
duties on imports or exports, "remains undiminished" and that the States "retain [their tax-
ing] authority in the most absolute and unqualified sense"); see also supra notes 9-11 and 
accompanying text. 
56. See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making 
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MacH. L. REV. 1091, 1124-25 (1986) (noting 
that there is nothing in the Commerce Clause text that would suggest to a modern reader that 
the states are forbidden to engage in protectionism against other states but that the text would 
have been understood to make that point at the time of its drafting). 
57. The specific concern was obtaining ratification by the State ofNew York, which 
was thought to be an important step in obtaining ratification by the requisite number of 
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ed concern about "unneighborly regulations" that would result in "injurious 
impediments to the ... different parts of the confederacy."58 In Number 7, 
Hamilton expressed concern with "those regulations of trade, by which par-
ticular States might endeavor to secure exclusive benefits to their own citi-
zens."59 
Professor Brannon P. Denning has argued that as between the anti-
protectionism component of the Commerce Clause and the aspect of the 
Commerce Clause that authorizes the regulation of national commerce, the 
former was more important to the Framers as "[t]he Framers did not neces-
sarily appreciate the economic benefits of a national common market, but 
they had firsthand experience with the political instability produced by re-
curring cycles of discrimination and retaliation between and among 
states."6° Consequently, the literal language of the Commerce Clause not-
withstanding, "the anti-discrimination principle was closer in scope to the 
evil the Commerce Clause and the related provisions were intended to rem-
edy."61 Numerous other scholars have made effectively the same point. For 
example, Professor Laurence Tribe noted that "[t]he function of the clause 
is to ensure national solidarity, not necessarily economic efficiency."62 Pro-
fessor Calvin Johnson has noted that, while "[i]t is now often stated that the 
major purpose of the ... [Commerce Clause] was to ... establish a common 
market with free trade across state borders[,] ... [b ]arriers on interstate 
commerce . . . were not a notable issue in the original debates. "63 In his 
states. See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of the 
Original Meaning of the United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REv. 801, 807-09 (2007). 
58. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note 9, at 137 (Alexander Hamilton). 
59. THE FEDERALIST No. 7, supra note 9, at 40 (Alexander Hamilton). 
60. Denning, supra note 15, at 634. 
61. /d. Professor Denning writes elsewhere that in the Commerce Clause, "the 
Framers sought 'interstate commercial harmony rather than market efficiency."' Brannon P. 
Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 417, 
481 (2008) (quoting Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 64 (1988)). Denning also notes "[t]hey were not doctrinaire free traders, 
and the Commerce Clause did not, to paraphrase Justice [Oliver Wendell] Holmes, enact Mr. 
Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations." /d. The intention behind the Clause was to restrict "states' 
abilities to tax or otherwise regulate interstate commerce in ways that tend to undermine the 
political union established by the Constitution by adopting measures likely to provoke retali-
ation by other states." /d. at 484-85. 
62. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1057 (3d ed. 2000). 
63. Calvin H. Johnson, The Panda's Thumb: The Modest and Mercantilist Original 
Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 3 (1984); see also Julian 
N. Eu1e, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 429 (1982) ("The 
Framers did not explicitly protect free trade."); Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the 
Federal Power and Incidentally to Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 554, 
578 n. 95 (1995) ("We know ... that the main reason for giving Congress the power to regu-
late interstate commerce was to allow Congress to override state protectionist measures."); 
Bork & Troy, supra note 15, at 852 ("Given the text of and purpose behind the [Commerce] 
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widely-cited, exhaustive research as to the Constitutional records, Professor 
Albert S. Abel discovered only nine references to the Commerce Clause, all 
directed to the dangers of interstate rivalry and retaliation.64 
B. Gibbons v. Ogden and the Early Commerce Clause Cases 
In the decades that followed the ratification of the Constitution, the 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause determined that the 
Clause not only has two separate thrusts, but also two distinct modes of 
application, again only one of which is supported by the text's literal lan-
guage. These two modes of application are the exercise of Congressional 
power under the affirmative Commerce Clause, which is the main focus of 
this Article, and the exercise of judicial review under the "dormant" Com-
merce Clause, in the absence of any Congressional legislation. 65 The first 
mode of application, which is textual, allows Congress to engage in substan-
tive policy-making as to national affairs.66 Because the states also have poli-
cy-making powers as to local affairs, there is the prospect for conflict, and 
in cases where the national interest is supreme, Congressional legislation 
may result in federal preemption.67 The second mode of application of the 
Commerce Clause-judicial power that has come to be applied under the 
so-called "dormant" Commerce Clause-is not the focus of this Article, but 
is nonetheless relevant to the analysis because the cases decided in this area 
Clause, Congress certainly has power, at a minimum, to displace state laws that discriminate 
against interstate commerce, either explicitly or implicitly."). 
64. Brannon P. Denning, Confederation-Era Discrimination Against Interstate 
Commerce and the Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 94 KY. L.J. 37, 
83 (2005) (citing Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention 
and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432,470-71 (1941)). 
65. See Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337-38 (2008) (noting that 
"[t]he Commerce Clause empowers Congress '[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several 
States' ... [but] although its terms do not expressly restrain 'the several States' in any way, 
we have sensed a negative implication in the provision since the early days"-a negative 
implication that "has come to be called the dormant Commerce Clause"); United Haulers 
Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338 (2007) (stating that 
although the Commerce Clause "does not in terms limit the power of States to regulate 
commerce, we have long interpreted the Commerce Clause as an implicit restraint on state 
authority, even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute"-the "so-called 'dormant' 
aspect of the Commerce Clause"). 
66. For example, Congress utilized the Commerce Clause to enact legislation that 
effectuated the "New Deal" in the 1930s and '40s and also to address racial discrimination in 
the 1960s. See infra notes 133-44 and accompanying text. 
67. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 770 
(1994) (stating that in areas where the states have "preexisting, concurrent lawmaking pow-
ers," state legislation has full effect unless it is in conflict with a "valid federal law"). 
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explain the meaning of the Commerce Clause authority granted to Con-
gress.68 
The first case to test Congressional power under the Commerce Clause 
was Gibbons v. Ogden in 1824, argued on behalf of the plaintiff by Daniel 
Webster, the future Massachusetts Senator.69 There the Court struck down a 
steamship monopoly conferred upon private persons by the state of New 
York to operate on the waters between New York and New Jersey because 
it conflicted with a federal coasting license.70 Gibbons was similar to the 
Commerce Clause cases that would eventually follow, in that it sought to 
determine whether the activity regulated, navigation on waters between the 
states, was ultimately subject to federal or state regulation.71 In later cases, 
the Court would at times determine that the subject being regulated was 
potentially subject to both state and federal regulation, at least when there 
was no conflict between the laws.72 As would eventually be true in most of 
the Court's later cases, Gibbons effectively resolved the dispute as to the 
appropriate legislating body by determining that the subject of Congress's 
regulation-navigation between the states-was interstate commerce that 
could not be subject to conflicting state regulation.73 
Despite the holding in Gibbons favoring Congress, it is significant that 
the Court felt it important to clarify-in response to the state's claim that it 
could both tax and regulate the activity in question-that substantive regula-
tion, "the power to regulate commerce," and "the power to lay and collect 
taxes" are "not ... similar in their terms or their nature."74 "The power of 
taxation is indispensible to [the States'] existence, and is a power, which, in 
its own nature, is capable of residing in, and being exercised by, different 
68. See infra notes 78-96. and accompanying text; see also Camps New-
found/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,574 (1997) (noting that the defini-
tion of "commerce" is the same whether it is applied under the dormant or the affirmative 
Commerce Clause); 
69. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I, memo. (1824). 
70. See id. at I. 
71. See generally infra Part II 
72. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (the federal Controlled Sub-
stances Act does not allow the U.S. Attorney General to prohibit doctors from prescribing 
regulated drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide under state law permitting the proce-
dure); see also Gardbaum, supra note 67, at 770 ("In itself, federal supremacy does not de-
prive states of their preexisting, concurrent lawmaking powers in a given area; rather, it 
means that a particular state law in conflict with a particular federal law will be trumped 
where both apply."). 
73. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189-222; see also Gardbaum, supra note 67, 
at 783 (noting that in the early twentieth century, "genuine" concurrent state and federal 
regulatory power gave way to a regime in which "the power of the states over interstate 
commerce was subordinate to that of Congress in all cases of Congressional action," fol-
lowed--beginning in the 1930s--by the current system in which concurrent power exists 
"until Congress clearly manifests its intent to [override state law]"). 
74. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 198. 
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authorities[,] [e.g., the state and federal government,] at the same time."75 In 
contrast, the conflict in Gibbons occurred because "when a State proceeds 
to regulate commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, it is 
exercising the very power that is granted to Congress, and is doing the very 
thing which Congress is authorized to do."76 The Court stated that "[t]here is 
no analogy, then, between the power of taxation and the power of regulating 
commerce."77 -
Gibbons was an affirmative Commerce Clause case, given that it re-
solved a direct conflict between state and federal law.78 However, despite 
Gibbons, for most of the nation's first century or so, judicial activity under 
the dormant Commerce Clause was more prevalent since as a practical mat-
ter what little federal economic legislation there was tended not to result in 
conflicts with state law.79 The dormant Commerce Clause cases of this time 
generally determined whether, in the absence of regulation by Congress, the 
states themselves were entitled to substantively regulate certain areas of 
commerce.80 These cases reflected a common theme and dealt "almost en-
tirely with the Commerce Clause as a limit on state legislation that discrim-
75. /d. at 199. 
76. /d. at 199-200. 
77. !d. at 200. Chief Justice John Marshall wrote similarly in McCullough v. Mary-
land, decided five years earlier: 
[T]hat the power of taxation is one of vital importance; that it is retained by the 
States; that it is not abridged by the grant of a similar power to the government of 
the Union; that it is to be concurrently exercised by the two governments; [these] 
are truths which have never been denied. 
17 U.S. ( 4 Wheat.) 316, 425 (1819) (case determining that a state could not impose tax on a 
U.S-chartered bank). Marshall did later, however, concede in Brown v. Maryland, that state 
taxation should be subject to some limits, in cases in which the tax was applied to items in 
commerce passing through the state or destined for another state, implicitly recognizing, it 
would seem, that such instances are ones that implicate the economic protectionism purpose 
reflected in the Commerce Clause: 
[T]he taxing power of the States must have some limits .... It cannot interfere with 
any regulation of commerce. If the States may tax all persons and property found 
on their territory, what shall restrain them from taxing goods in their transit 
through the State from one port to another, for the purpose of re-exportation? ... 
Or what should restrain a State from taxing any article passing through it from one 
State to another for the purpose of traffic or from taxing the transportation of arti-
cles passing from the State itself to another State, for commercial purposes? These 
cases are all within the sovereign power of taxation, but would obviously derange 
the measures of Congress to regulate commerce and affect materially the purpose 
for which that power was given. 
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419,448-49 (1827) (case in which the federal tariff laws were deemed 
to constitute a license to import, barring Maryland's imposition of a tax on importers of 
foreign goods). 
78. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1-3. 
79. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill, 121 (1942) (discussing this early history 
of cases). 
80. See id.; Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549,553-54 (1995). 
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inated against interstate commerce."81 In general, the Court concluded that 
certain categories of activities, such as production, manufacturing, and min-
ing could be regulated by the states in which the activity occurred, and 
hence this regulation was "beyond the power of Congress under the Com-
merce Clause."82 
In the late 1800s, the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act and 
Sherman Antitrust Act "ushered in a new era of federal regulation under the 
commerce power."83 These federal statutes, directed at private commercial 
activity, required the Supreme Court to adjudicate, at times, actual conflicts 
between federal and state interests. 84 In general, when these cases first 
reached the Supreme Court, the Court "imported" from the dormant Com-
merce Clause cases the notion that Congress could not regulate inherently 
intrastate "activities such as production, manufacturing, and mining."85 
Simultaneously, however, the Court concluded that "where the interstate 
and intrastate aspects of commerce were so mingled together that full regu-
lation of interstate commerce required incidental regulation of intrastate 
commerce, the Commerce Clause authorized such regulation."86 These latter 
cases led to difficult determinations as to whether the effects of the federal 
regulation in question "directly" or "indirectly" impacted interstate com-
merce.87 
81. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553. An analogous case in the state tax area was Welton v. 
Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875) (striking down'as impermissibly discriminatory a state license 
tax imposed on persons "who deal in the sale of goods, wares and merchandise which are not 
the growth, produce or manufacture of the state"). 
82. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 554; see Wickard, 317 U.S. at 121. In contrast, state regula-
tion of interstate--as opposed to intrastate--commerce was prohibited under the dormant 
Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Case of State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872) (de-
termining that the state tax imposed on freight transported from state to state was the equiva-
lent of a direct regulation of interstate commerce and therefore impermissible). 
83. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 554; see Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 
(1887); Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 
1017, 1019 (1988) ("The Interstate Commerce Act was the first comprehensive regulatory 
measure passed by Congress."). Professor James W. Ely, Jr. has noted that Congressional 
regulation largely began after the beginning of the Civil War with respect to railroads, and 
that prior to the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887, there was some minor 
history of Congressional regulation in that context. See James W. Ely, Jr., "The Railroad 
System has Burst Through State Limits": Railroads and Interstate Commerce, 1830-1920,55 
ARK. L. REV. 933, 965-66 (2003). 
84. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 121. 
85. !d.; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 554. 
86. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 554. 
87. !d. at 554-55. 
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C. The "New Deal" and the Evolution of the Court's Modem Dormant 
Commerce Clause Doctrine 
59 
Beginning in the late 1930s, in the course of reviewing the federal 
"New Deal" legislation, the Supreme Court liberalized its review of federal 
statutes pursuant to the Commerce Clause.88 The resulting cases dispensed 
with the "direct" versus "indirect" approach that the Court had previously 
applied in favor of an approach that viewed the "interstate commerce" sub-
ject to federal regulation more broadly, potentially including purely in-state 
activity that had a "substantial economic effect" on interstate commerce. 89 
These cases "greatly expanded the previously defined authority of Congress 
under [the Commerce] Clause."90 
However, as the Court's affirmative Commerce Clause doctrine ma-
tured in the early to middle part of the twentieth century, its dormant Com-
merce Clause cases, which initially had informed its affirmative Commerce 
Clause cases, retained the latter cases' discarded analytic framework. 
Hence, for example, in the state tax context, under the dormant Commerce 
Clause, the notion that the states could only tax in-state activity akin to pro-
duction, manufacturing, and mining was not finally put to rest until North-
western States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota in 1959.91 Also, vestiges 
of the direct-indirect analysis, which generally held that the states could not 
place direct burdens on interstate commerce, lived on through cases like 
Freeman v. Hewi/92 until Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady93 in 1977.94 In 
Freeman v. Hew it, the Court struck down a state tax not on the basis of eco-
nomic protectionism, but rather on the theory-rooted in the direct/indirect 
burden concept-that the dormant Commerce Clause "created an area of 
trade free from interference by the states."95 However, Complete Auto, 
which ushered in the Court's "modem era" of dormant Commerce Clause 
cases in the state tax context, rejected that line of reasoning, concluding, 
among other things, that administrative inconvenience is not a basis for re-
lieving multistate taxpayers from their share of the states' tax burden and 
that, therefore, "interstate commerce may be made to pay its way.'>96 
88. /d. at 555-56. 
89. /d. 
90. /d. 
91. 358 U.S. 450 (1959). 
92. 329 U.S. 249, 265-66 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring). 
93. 430 u.s. 274,280-81 (1977). 
94. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex ref. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298,309-10 (1992) 
(discussing the renunciation of Freeman in Complete Auto). 
95. Freeman, 329 U.S. at 252. 
96. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 288 n.l5; see Tracy A. Kaye, Tax Discrimination: A 
Comparative Analysis of U.S. and E.U. Approaches, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 47, 88 (2005) (noting 
that the rule stating that a state may not directly tax interstate commerce-the so-called 
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As the progression of dormant Commerce Clause cases suggests, the 
Court has been willing to revisit and restate its interpretative doctrine.97 
Eventually, two sets of judicial tests emerged to evaluate the constitutionali-
ty under the dormant Commerce Clause of state taxes, on the one hand, and 
non-tax state regulations, on the other. The standards to evaluate a state tax 
are set forth in the four-part test referenced in Complete Auto Transit v. 
Brady,98 which includes as one of its four "prongs" a test as to whether the 
state tax is unconstitutionally discriminatory. The standards to evaluate a 
state non-tax regulation are two-part, consisting of a test as to whether the 
non-tax regulation is discriminatory and a second test, as referenced in Pike 
v. Bruce Church, Inc. ,99 that weighs the respective benefits and burdens of 
such regulation. 100 But each of these multipart tests are now dated, and the 
Supreme Court has recently made it clear that it is no longer particularly 
enamored with either-apart from the discrimination standard included in 
each-such that it is possible that a restatement of the relevant standards 
may be forthcoming in each area. 101 
"Formal Rule"-was abandoned in Complete Auto); Howard 0. Hunter, Federalism and 
State Taxation of Multistate Enterprises, 32 EMORY L.J. 89, 95 (I 983) ("The thrust of the 
Formal Rule was that a state may not impose a tax on any activity or process viewed by the 
Court as a part of interstate commerce."); Regan, supra note 56, at I 093-94 (noting that the 
"modem era of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence" began with the "abandonment of 
the 'direct/indirect' burdens test" in non-tax cases in 1945, but that the test "hung on a bit 
longer" in state tax cases, through Freeman). 
97. See Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457 (1959) 
(describing the Court's focus as "'clearing up the tangled underbrush of past cases' with 
reference to the taxing power of the States") (citations omitted); see also Complete Auto, 430 
U.S. at 287-89; Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 309-10. 
98. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 277-79. 
99. 397 u.s. 137, 142 (1970). 
I 00. See id. Under the Pike balancing test, "where the statute regulates evenhandedly 
to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only 
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly exces-
sive in relation to the putative local benefits." !d. "If a legitimate local purpose is found, then 
the question becomes one of degree." !d. "[T]he extent of the burden that will be tolerated 
will, of course, depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be 
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities." !d. 
101. Professors Norman R. Williams and Brannon P. Denning have recently com-
mented on what they call the "twilight of Pike balancing." See Norman R. Williams & Bran-
non P. Denning, The "New Protectionism" and the American Common Market, 85 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 247, 304-10 (2009). They note that by their count a majority of the Court has 
not invalidated a law by applying Pike in over twenty years and suggest that the "rather 
desultory" and "tepid" evaluations of the standard in United Haulers Ass 'n v. Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330 (2007), and Department of 
Revenue of Kentucy v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (2008), call into question its future viability. !d. 
at 304. The tests referenced in Complete Auto, in the state tax area, have also recently fared 
poorly. Over the past fifteen years the Court has taken only one case, MeadWestvaco Co. v. 
lllinois Department of Revenue, 553 U.S. 16, 25 (2008), that probed anything other than a 
discrimination claitll--{)nly one of Complete Auto's four prongs--and in MeadWestvaco, an 
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The Court's apparent general difficulty with the dormant Commerce 
Clause tests that have emerged in the tax and non-tax areas is that the Court 
now views these tests-apart from the discrimination test that is applied in 
both contexts-as having a broader focus than the Court's historic and lim-
ited purpose under the dormant Commerce Clause to evaluate economic 
protectionism (as the Court itself is not empowered under that Clause to 
"regulate Commerce ... among the several state~"). 102 As the Court recently 
stated in Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, "The modem law of 
what has come to be called the dormant Commerce Clause is driven by con-
cern about 'economic protectionism-that is, regulatory measures designed 
to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competi-
tors. "'103 Justices Scalia and Thomas are repeatedly on the record as stating 
that they would dispense with all inquiries under the dormant Commerce 
Clause, though neither would abandon cases that involve a claim of pur-
ported state discrimination. 104 
So-called "Pike balancing" has the particular problem that rather than 
merely evaluating a state's purported attempt at protectionist behavior in the 
apportionment case, the Court's primary disposition was to remand the case for further state 
court proceedings. See id. at 416-17. Further, most of the Court's state tax dormant Com-
merce Clause cases taken over the past fifteen years--MeadWestvaco included--don't even 
mention Complete Auto. See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text; see also Oklahoma 
Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 201 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I 
would not apply the remainder of the eminently unhelpful, so-called 'four-part test' of Com-
plete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady ... I look forward to the day when Complete Auto will take 
its rightful place in Part II of the Court's opinion, among the other useless and discarded 
tools of our negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence.") (citations omitted). 
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
I 03. 553 U.S. at 337-38 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 
273-74 (1988)). The Court also stated that "[t]he point is to 'effectuat[e] the Framers' pur-
pose to 'prevent a State from retreating into [the] economic isolation' 'that had plagued 
relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confedera-
tion."' /d. at 338 (quoting Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 330 (1996); Hughes v. 
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979)) (brackets and secondary quotes omitted). 
104. See Edward A. Zelinsky & Brannon P. Denning, Debate, The Future of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause: Abolishing the Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation, 155 U. 
PA. L. REV. 196, 203 (2007) (comments of Professor Denning); see also Davis, 553 U.S. at 
359 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating, "I will apply our negative Commerce Clause doctrine 
only when stare decisis compels me to do so. In my view it is 'an unjustified judicial inter-
vention, not to be expanded beyond its existing domain."') (citation omitted); id. at 361 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that "I would entirely 'discard the Court's negative Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence"' because it '"has no basis in the text of the Constitution, makes 
little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in application."') (citation omitted) (quotes 
omitted); see also United Haulers Assn., 550 U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that 
"[t]he historical record provides no grounds for reading the Commerce Clause to be other 
than what it says-an authonzation for Congress to regulate commerce," but that he would 
be "willing to enforce on stare decisis grounds a 'negative' self-executing Commerce Clause 
... against a state law that facially discrimmates against interstate commerce."). 
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non-tax context, it allows for a balancing of the state benefits and commer-
cial burdens imposed by the state legislation-a determination that is some-
times referred to as an evaluation as to whether the state regulation imposes 
an "undue burden" on interstate commerce. 105 While balancing tests were in 
vogue in Supreme Court jurisprudence several decades ago, the Court now 
views such inquiries as a subjective exercise that, in addition, involve con-
siderations that are inherently legislative rather than judicial in nature. 106 
The four tests of Complete Auto are also problematic in part because 
one of them, the "fairly related" test, has no apparent stringency, 107 and two 
of the remaining three tests, the nexus and fair apportionment standards, 
generally embody Due Process notions. 108 Significantly, the last time the 
Court took a nexus case-nearly twenty years ago in Quill Corp. v. North 
Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp in 1992-it suggested it had incorrectly decided 
Quill's predecessor case from twenty-five years earlier, National Bellas 
Hess, Inc. v. Illinois Department of Revenue,109 which it was then revisit-
ing. 110 Quill retained the holding in Bellas Hess, but restated the logic to 
105. See DavidS. Day, The "Mature" Rehnquist Court and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause Doctrine: the Expanded Discrimination Tier, 52 S.D. L. REV. I, 1-2 (2007) (noting 
that the second aspect of the dormant Commerce Clause test applied to non-tax state regula-
tions is "commonly referred to as the 'undue burden' standard."). 
I 06. See United Haulers Ass 'n., 550 U.S. at 347; Davis, 553 U.S. at 353-56; see also 
Denning, supra note 61, at 453-57 (surveying the rise and fall of the use of the balancing 
approach in the Court's dormant Commerce Clause cases); Day, supra note 105, at 50 (not-
ing that a "remarkable feature of the end of the Rehnquist Court was that ... [t]he nondis-
crimination tier [of the two-part test applied to state non-tax regulations] had fallen into 
rather obvious non-use"). 
107. The Court has stated that the "fairly related" standard is related to the nexus 
standard and can be satisfied by "general services" provided by the state. See Commonwealth 
Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 626 (1981 ); Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 267 
(1989). Since this standard is so easily satisfied, it is almost never at issue. Cf Zelinsky & 
Denning, supra note 104, at 205 (stating that "[c]ourts have heretofore been so reluctant to .. 
. [apply] the 'fairly related' prong of Complete Auto (that it] has become a dead letter") 
(comments of Brannon P. Denning); Kathryn L. Moore, State and Local Taxation of Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce: The Second Best Solution, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1425, 1459 
(1996) ("(I]t is not entirely clear what content, if any, this [fairly related] prong contains, for 
the Court has yet to strike down a state tax based solely on this prong of the Complete Auto 
test."). 
I 08. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rei. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 305, 318-19 
(1992) (stating that the Due Process and Commerce Clause aspects of the nexus analysis are 
"closely related," but resting its decision on Commerce Clause grounds so that Congress 
would be free to reconsider it); see also infra notes 290, 292 and accompanying text. Profes-
sors Jesse H. Choper and Tung Yin have argued that the four Complete Auto tests are need-
lessly complicated because they are "functionally redundant." See Jesse H. Choper & Tung 
Yin, State Taxation and the Dormant Commerce Clause: the Object-Measure Approach, 
1998 SuP. CT. REv. 193, 193 (1998). 
109. 386 u.s. 753 (1967). 
II 0. The Court stated, for example, that "contemporary Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence might not dictate the same result were the issue to arise for the first time today," that 
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make clear that Congress could overrule it. 111 Only three of the eight Justic-
es who decided Quill remain on the Court, and each of those Justices filed a 
single concurrence in that case in which they stated that they were not up-
holding Bellas Hess based upon its logic, but rather on the basis of stare 
decisis. 112 Almost all of the recent state tax cases that the Court has taken 
under the dormant Commerce Clause have been discrimination cases--of 
which there have been severaP 13-and often those cases no longer even pay 
lip service to Complete Auto. 114 
D. The Economic Protectionism Principle in the Court's Contemporary 
Dormant Commerce Clause Jurisprudence 
What seems clear is that the Supreme Court's current mode of analysis 
in dormant Commerce Clause cases is to focus on whether the state legisla-
tion being reviewed reflects economic protectionism, consistent with the 
purposes that underlie the Commerce Clause. 115 In non-tax cases, this im-
plies that so-called "Pike balancing,"-an evaluation of "undue burdens"-
may no longer be relevant. However, in any event, such Pike-like "free 
trade" considerations were eliminated decades ago from the dormant Com-
merce Clause inquiry as applied to the imposition of a state tax. 116 These 
the rule in the case was "artificial at its edges," and that a similar rule had not been applied 
by the Court in any other instances. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 311, 315, 318; see also infra 
notes 259-67 and accompanying text. 
Ill. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 320 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I would not revisit the 
merits of [Bellas Hess], but would adhere to it on the basis of stare decisis."). Justice Scalia 
was joined in his concurrence by Justices Kennedy and Thomas. See id. at 319. 
112. !d. at318-19. 
113. See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005); American Trucking Ass'ns 
v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 545 U.S. 429 (2005); S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 
U.S. 160 (1999); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997); Camps New-
found/Owatonna, Inc. v. Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997). Of the cases referenced, only Amer-
ican Trucking Ass'ns, 545 U.S. at 438, and Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 
618, mention Complete Auto. 
114. The Court's one fair apportionment case from this period also failed to reference 
Complete Auto. MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 553 U.S. 16, 25 (2008); see 
also supra note I 01. 
115. See Williams & Denning, supra note 101, at 249 ("[A)ntipathy to local protec-
tionism has been a hallmark of the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence."); Choper & 
Yin, supra note 108, at 199-200 (noting the "Dormant Commerce Clause's core prohibition 
of discrimination against interstate commerce"). 
116. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (discussing the advent of Com-
plete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977)). The principle espoused by Complete 
Auto rejecting a free trade rationale has been echoed in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Barclay's 
Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298,310 (1994)("The [Commerce] Clause 
does not shield interstate (or foreign) commerce from its 'fair share of the state tax burden."' 
(quoting Dep't of Revenue of Wash. v. Ass'n. of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 750 
(1978))); Quill Corp, 504 U.S. at 310 n.5 (1992) ('"It was not the purpose of the commerce 
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two distinct analytic approaches as applied to tax and non-tax state legisla-
tion-which implicitly reflect heightened respect for the states' taxing pow-
er since the "undue burden" test does not apply in that context-are similar 
to the two-part approach suggested by Gibbons v. Ogden. 117 Also, to the 
extent that these two divergent approaches suggest a heightened respect for 
the states' taxing power, they are consistent with the Court's recently ex-
pressed concern that the states must be free to engage in sovereign acts, 118 as 
well as the Constitutional Framers' recognition that the imposition of state 
taxes is perhaps the most significant such sovereign act. 119 
The Court's cases have revealed that the state discrimination to be po-
liced under the Commerce Clause may take many forms and is not always 
easy to identify in practice, but there is nonetheless a clear definition of the 
outer parameters of such discrimination. 12° For example, as stated by Chief 
Justice Roberts in the recent decision, United Haulers Ass 'n v. Oneida-
clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of[the] state tax 
burden even though it increases the cost of doing business."' (quoting Commonwealth Edi-
son Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 623-24 (1981))); see also Nw. States Portland Cement 
Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 461-62 (1959) ("[I]t is axiomatic that the founders did not 
intend to immunize [interstate] commerce from carrying its fair share of the costs of the state 
government in return for the benefits it derives from within the State."). 
117. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199 (1824); see supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text; see 
also Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959) (corporate net 
income taxes "are not regulations in any sense of that term"); Daniel Shaviro, An Economic 
and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 895, 942 (1992) ("The Su-
preme Court may treat tax cases as meriting greater deference to state and local governments 
than regulation cases because it regards the power to tax as at the heart of a government's 
sovereignty."); Kaye, supra note 96, at 89 (stating, "The [Supreme] Court grants greater 
deference to state and local taxation autonomy than [it does to state actions at issue in] 
Commerce Clause cases involving regulation.") (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §6-15, at 442 (2d. ed. 1988)). 
118. See United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt, 550 U.S. 330, 
343 (2007) ("The dormant Commerce Clause is not a roving license for federal courts to 
decide what activities are appropriate for state and local government to undertake."); id. 
(expressing apprehension at potential unprecedented interference by the courts with a tradi-
tional government function); Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 340 ("State 
and local governments that provide public goods and services on their 6wn, unlike private 
businesses, are 'vested with the responsibility of protecting the health, safety, and welfare of 
[their] citizens' ... and laws favoring such States and their subdivisions may 'be directed 
toward any number oflegitimate goals unrelated to protectionism."' (quoting United Haulers 
Ass 'n, 550 U.S. at 343)) (also expressing apprehension at potential unprecedented interfer-
ence by the courts with a traditional government function). 
119. See supra notes 9-11, 55 and accompanying text. 
120. See Choper & Yin, supra note I 08, at 199 ("Although the question of what 
constitutes discrimination is complex and multifaceted, the evil generally stated, is a state 
policy whose purpose or effect is to confer advantages on local interests at the expense of 
out -of-staters."). 
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Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 121 "any notion of discrimina-
tion assumes a comparison of substantially similar entities."122 Further, in a 
subsequent case, Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, 123 the Court 
stated that "[t]he modem law of what has come to be called the dormant 
Commerce Clause is driven by concerns about 'economic protectionism-
that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests 
by burdening out-of-state competitors. "'124 Davis stated that "[t]he point is 
to 'effectuat[e] the Framers' purpose to "prevent a State from retreating into 
[the] economic isolation"' ... 'that had plagued relations among the Colo-
nies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation. "'125 
Because Congress has broader investigative powers than the Supreme 
Court, it evidently has broader ability to enforce the anti-protectionism prin-
ciples of the Commerce Clause--effectively the ability to find discrimina-
tion in situations where the Supreme Court might not. 126 However, congres-
sional efforts to eliminate discriminatory state legislation under the affirma-
tive Commerce Clause must logically, nonetheless, apply the same standard 
of discrimination as that applied by the Court under the dormant Commerce 
Clause, as the standard in each instance has the same constitutional deriva-
tion and meaning. 127 Indeed, as has been noted, such parallel interpretations 
121. 550 U.S. 330 (2007) (holding that a New York state ordinance forcing private 
waste management companies to deliver waste to a public facility did not discriminate 
against interstate commerce). 
122. /d. at 342 (quoting General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278,298 (1997)). 
123. 553 U.S. 328 (2008) (holding that the State of Kentucky does not engage in 
unconstitutional discrimination against interstate commerce by exempting the interest on its 
bonds from residents' taxable income while taxing the interest earned on the bonds of other 
states). 
124. /d. at 337-38 (quoting New Energy Co. oflnd. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-
74 (1988)). 
125. !d. at 338 (internal citations omitted). The Court's statement drew from the 
Court's prior holdings in Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1996); Oklahoma 
Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179-80 (1995); and Hughes v. Oklaho-
ma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979). 
126. See Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 
117 (200 I) (noting the "rich informality" of Congressional information gathering as com-
pared to the "structured record evidence" that is introduced in a court proceeding); Hanah 
Metchis Volokh, Congressional Immunity Grants and Separation of Powers: Legislative 
Vetoes of Federal Prosecutions, 95 GEO. L.J. 2017, 2031-32 (2007) (noting "Congress has an 
inherent power to conduct investigations in pursuit of its enumerated powers" and exploring 
the history of the use of such investigative power). 
127. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text (discussing the Framers' notion of 
discrimination as reflected within the Commerce Clause); cf Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 
Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 574 (1997) (noting that the definition of "com-
merce" is the same when applied by the Supreme Court in a dormant Commerce Clause case 
as it is when applied by Congress when acting pursuant to the affirmative Commerce 
Clause). 
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of the dormant and affirmative Commerce Clause have long characterized 
the history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 128 
II. PREEMPTION OF A NON-DISCRIMINATORY STATE TAX IS NOT A 
"REGULATION OF ... COMMERCE AMONG THE SEVERAL STATES" 
In instances in which a state tax is not discriminatory within the mean-
ing of the Commerce Clause, there is no basis for a congressional preemp-
tion of that tax on the grounds that the state has engaged in economic pro-
tectionism.129 Instead, the question is whether the state tax can be otherwise 
preempted under the Congress's substantive, textual power to "regulate ... 
commerce among the several states."130 
A. The Commerce Clause Cases, 193 7-1995 
This Article previously discussed the Supreme Court cases that pre-
ceded the Court's consideration of the federal "New Deal" legislation. 131 
Those early Court cases evaluated the permissibility of substantive Con-
gressional legislation under the Commerce Clause based on whether the 
legislation was directed at wholly intrastate activity or, alternatively, "di-
rectly" or "indirectly" impacted interstate-as opposed to intrastate-
commerce.132 The Court's more liberal, modern approach to evaluating such 
legislation under the Commerce Clause began in 193 7 with NLRB v. Jones 
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 133 in which the Court upheld the National Labor 
Relations Act. 134 The Court's New Deal cases continued in United States v. 
Darby, 135 where the Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 136 
including minimum wage and maximum hour requirements as applied to 
private employees and employers, and in Wickard v. Fill burn, 137 often 
128. See supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text. 
129. But see the discussion of the issue of "fair apportionment," irifra notes 291-94 
and accompanying text. 
130. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. 
131. See supra Section I. B. 
132. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1995); see supra notes 83-87 
and accompanying text. 
133. 301 u.s. 1, 37 (1937). 
134. Pub. L. No. 74-198,49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 
(2006)). 
135. 312U.S.100(1941). 
136. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006)). 
137. 317U.S.I11 (1942). 
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thought to be the furthest extension of Congress's Commerce power. 138 In 
Wickard, the federal law that was upheld limited the wheat that a farmer 
grew for his own consumption, despite the fact that the regulated activity 
was entirely local and arguably not "comrnerce."139 Wickard concluded that 
this private activity was subject to Commerce Clause regulation because the 
aggregation of similar such private activities, if left unregulated, could have 
a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce.140 
The Supreme Court's broad New Deal holdings found later applica-
tion in two cases upholding the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited 
racial discrimination in places of public accommodation. In those cases, 
Katzenbach v. McClung141 and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United 
States, 142 the Court concluded that a restaurant and hotel were subject to 
Commerce Clause regulation under the substantial effects test because, in 
the case of the restaurant, interstate supplies were consumed, 143 and in the 
case of the hotel, persons traveling from other states were frequently offered 
lodging. 144 
However, even as the Court was extending its broad Commerce 
Clause holdings in the Civil Rights cases, it began the process of narrowing 
these precedents, particularly in the instance of Congressional regulation 
directed not at private commercial activity, but at activity undertaken by the 
states "as states." In 1968, in Wirtz v. Maryland; 45 the Court extended 
FLSA to state and local workers employed at schools, hospitals, and institu-
tions. The Court was sensitive to the Tenth Amendment issue, but stated 
that "valid general regulations of commerce do not cease to be regulations 
of commerce because a State is involved" and that "if a state is engaging in 
economic activities that are validly regulated by the Federal Government 
when engaged in by private persons, the State too may be forced to conform 
its activities to federal regulation."146 Seven years later, in Fry v. United 
138. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (citing Wickard as 
"perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activi-
ty"). 
139. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125. 
140. /d. at 128-30. During the New Deal era, the Court also held that Congress could 
validate a state tax that would otherwise be impermissibly discriminatory against interstate 
commerce because the Commerce Clause allows Congress to burden or even "prohibit" 
interstate commerce "subject only to the restrictions placed upon its authority by other con-
stitutional provisions and the requirement that it shall not invade the domains of action re-
served exclusively for the states." Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 434 (1946). 
141. 379 u.s. 294 (1964). 
142. 379 u.s. 241 (1964). 
143. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 299-301. 
144. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 252-53. 
145. 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by Nat') League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 
(I 976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (I 985). 
146. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 196-97. 
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States, 147 the Court applied a similar, careful analysis to uphold the Econom-
ic Stabilization Act of 1970,148 which temporarily froze the wages of all 
workers, including state and local government employees. 
Then, one year later, in 1976, in National League of Cities v. Usery, 149 
the Court struck down FLSA as applied to most state and local employees, 
and reversed Wirtz. 150 The Court rejected the notion that the states could be 
regulated like private citizens under the Commerce Clause. 151 The Court 
concluded that Congress has broad power to regulate private citizens, but 
stated that "the States as States stand on a quite different footing from an 
individual or a corporation when challenging the exercise of Congress' 
power to regulate commerce."152 The Court stated that the law could not 
stand because it would "directly displace the States' freedom to structure 
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions."153 
After Usery, federal courts wrestled with the "traditional government 
functions" test. Questions arose as to whether certain activities were tradi-
tional or integral state functions, including those that could be performed by 
either the states or private citizens, such as, for example, the operation of an 
airport, performance of solid waste disposal, operation of a telephone sys-
tem, leasing and sale of natural gas, operation of a mental health facility, 
and provision of in-house domestic services for the aged and handi-
capped.154 Therefore, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity, 155 the Court overruled Usery, and applied the provisions of FLSA to 
public workers. 156 Garcia rejected as "unsound in principle and unworkable 
in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a 
judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is 'integral' 
147. 421 U.S. 542 (1975). 
148. Pub. L.No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799-800 (1970). 
149. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. 528. 
150. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, overruled by Usery, 426 U.S. at 852-855 (1976), overruled 
by Garcia, 469 U.S. 528. 
151. The Court stated that: 
It is one thing to recognize the authority of Congress to enact laws regulating indi-
vidual businesses necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the government of 
the Nation and of the State in which they reside. It is quite another to uphold a sim-
ilar exercise of congressional authority directed, not to private citizens, but to the 
States as States. We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sover-
eignty attaching to every state government which may not be impaired by Con-
gress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority 
to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the 
authority in that manner. 
Usery, 426 U.S. at 845. 
152. Usery, 426 U.S. at 854. 
153. /d. at 852. 
154. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 538-39 (referencing these and additional examples). 
155. 469 U.S. 528. 
156. /d. at 555-57. 
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or 'traditional. "'157 The Court vote in both Usery and Garcia was five-to-
four, with Justice Blackmun changing sides. 158 In his dissent in Garcia, Jus-
tice Rehnquist, who authored the majority opinion in Usery, stated that Us-
ery represented "a principle that will, I am confident, in time again com-
mand the support of a majority of this Court."159 
Garcia was predicated in large part on the fact that most commercial 
activity that is subject to regulation by Congress can be performed by either 
private or public actors. It noted that "[t]he most obvious defect of a histori-
cal approach to state immunity"-like that evaluating whether the state ac-
tion in question is "traditional"-"is that it prevents a court from accommo-
dating changes in the historical functions of States, changes that have re-
sulted in a number of once-private functions like education being assumed 
by the States and their subdivisions."160 The Court also observed that 
[t]he essence of our federal system is that within the realm of authority left open to 
them under the Constitution, the States must be equally free to engage in any activ-
ity that their citizens choose for the common weal, no matter how unorthodox or 
unnecessary anyone else-including the judiciary-deems state involvement to 
be.t6t 
As the Court noted, in critique of the stricken judicial rule from Usery, 
"[ m ]any governmental functions of today have at some time in the past been 
non-governmental."162 • 
B. The Commerce Clause Cases Subsequent to 1995 
In the aftermath of Usery and Garcia, the Court re-articulated the rule 
in Garcia as being one that allows the states to be made subject to a federal 
regulation "of general application"-a regulation that applies equally to the 
states as it would to private actors. 163 In two subsequent cases, South Caro-
lina v. Baker, 164 and Reno v. Condon, 165 the Court, consistent with Garcia, 
157. /d. at 546-47. 
158. Justice Blackmun wrote the decision for the five-to-four majority in Garcia. 469 
U.S. at 528. Previously, he provided the decisive fifth vote in Usery, and explained his vote 
to join the five-to-four majority in a concurrence. 426 U.S. at 856 (Biackmun, J. concurring). 
159. 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
160. /d. at 543-44. 
161. !d. at 546. 
162. /d. (quoting Helvering v. Gerhardt, 340 U.S. 405,427 (1938) (Black, J., concur-
ring)). 
163. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 758-59 (1982) (stating "National 
League of Cities, like Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), presented a problem the 
Court often confronts: the extent to which state sovereignty shields the States from generally 
applicable federal regulations"); see id. at 759 (distinguishing such situations from one in 
which the federal government "attempts to use state regulatory machinery to advance federal 
goals"). 
164. 485 U.S. 505 (1988). 
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upheld federal laws of "general application" that, respectively, prohibited 
States from issuing unregistered bonds and regulated the disclosure of driv-
er information. 166 It is to be noted that this post-Garcia judicial approach 
generally suggests a broad scope for most forms of federal regulation vis-a-
vis the states. 167 However, the general application standard is apparently 
limiting in the instance of a Congressional attempt to preempt a state tax. 
The imposition of a state tax is not an action private citizens can perform 
and therefore cannot be impacted by a federal law of general application. 168 
Further, while Garcia was based on the general inability to delineate "inte-
gral" and "traditional" government functions in the large majority of cases 
where the question is difficult, there is no question that the imposition of a 
state tax is an integral and traditional government function, as Alexander 
Hamilton himself suggested in the Federalist Papers. 169 
Since Garcia, the Court has decided two sets of cases that revisit the 
state sovereignty concerns of Usery, both of which announce principles that 
rein in the federal Commerce power. In the first set of cases, New York v. 
United States 170 and Printz v. United States, 171 the Court considered federal 
laws directed at the states that were not laws of general applicability, but 
rather instances where Congress sought to "commandeer" state employees 
165. 528 u.s. 141 (2000). 
166. See generally Baker, 485 U.S. at 514-15; Reno, 528 U.S. at 151. Reno noted that 
Congress may regulate the States by means of"generally applicable" laws, or laws that apply 
to individuals as well as States, and concluded that the statute in question was generally 
applicable as it "regulates the universe of entities that participate as suppliers to the market 
for motor vehicle information-the States as initial suppliers of the information in interstate 
commerce and private resellers or redisclosers of that information in commerce." !d. Baker 
concluded that Congress could require the states, like private actors, to issue bonds in regis-
tered form. 485 U.S. at 511-15; see id. at 529-30 (Rehnquist, C.J, concurring) (referencing 
the "well supported conclusion" that the statute in question would have only a de minimis 
effect on the state's ability to raise debt capital and upon the manner in which the state would 
raise this capital). 
167. Garcia posited that the primary protections to be afforded to the states under the 
Tenth Amendment in such cases would derive from the operation of the "national political 
process," a process that might fail in any given instance. 469 U.S. at 554-55. The four-Justice 
dissent vigorously disagreed with this view. !d. at 564-67 & nn.7-11. In Baker, the state 
challenging the federal statute asserted that the political process had failed, a claim that the 
Court rejected. 485 U.S. at 513. But Baker, like Garcia, refused to specify under what cir-
cumstances the political process will be deemed to have failed, see id., and this standard was 
not referenced in the later case, Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000). Further, unlike in the 
case where a statute is one of general application that affects the interests of private citizens 
equally, there is no reason to assume that the political process will adequately protect the 






See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
See supra notes 3, 9-11, 55 and accompanying text. 
505 u.s. 144 (1992). 
521 u.s. 898 (1997). 
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into federal service. The law struck down in New York required the States' 
legislatures to develop a plan to dispose of low-level radioactive waste and 
to take title to and possession of the waste if the state did not develop a plan 
by a certain date; 172 the law struck down in Printz required state police to 
perform background checks and other activities in connection with gun pur-
chases.173 In striking down the latter law, Printz relied upon the analysis in 
New York, stating that "[t]he Constitution ... contemplates that a State's 
government will represent and remain accountable to its own citizens.'' 174 
Although the preemption of a state tax does not effect a "commandeering" 
of state employees within the meaning of New York and Printz, it is signifi-
cant that in such tax preemption cases the federal law is not one of general 
application, similar to the facts in New York and Printz. Also, the federal 
displacement of state tax revenues raises accountability concerns similar to 
those that were deemed significant in New York and Printz. 175 
In the second set of cases, United States v. Lopez176 and United States 
v. Morrison, 177 the Court revisited its New Deal and Civil Rights cases, in 
each case striking down a Congressional attempt to regulate private intra-
state activity on the theory that the federal regulation invaded the realm of 
state sovereignty. In Lopez, the Court struck down a law that sought to make 
it a federal offense for an individual to knowingly possess a firearm at a 
place that the individual knows or has reasonable cause to know is a school 
zone. 178 In Morrison, the Court struck down a law that would have provided 
a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-based violence. 179 In both cases, 
the Court concluded that the non-economic intrastate activity regulated was 
not commerce and did not "substantially affect" commerce, and that, there-
fore, the activity was not within the scope of the Commerce Clause. 180 
172. 505 U.S. at 150-54. ln ruling as it did, the Court noted that "where the Federal 
Government directs the states to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of 
public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may re-
main insulated from the electoral ramifications oftheir decision." /d. at 169. 
173. 521 U.S. at 902-03. In so ruling, the Court stated that: 
[b ]y forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a 
federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" 
problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with 
higher federal taxes. And even when the States are not forced to absorb the costs of 
implementing a federal program, they are still put in the position of taking the 
blame for its burdensomeness and for its defects. 
!d. at 930. 
174. Printz, 521 U.S. at 920 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69). 
175. See supra notes 172, 173 and accompanying text. 
176. 514U.S.549(1995). 
177. 529 u.s. 598 (2000). 
178. 514 U.S. at 567. 
179. 529 U.S. at 627. 
180. In Lopez, the Court concluded that the criminal statute in question "ha[d] noth-
ing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might 
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As with New York and Printz, it remains to be considered by analogy 
what the implications of Lopez and Morrison are with respect to a Congres-
sional preemption of a non-discriminatory state tax since neither Supreme 
Court case evaluated that specific issue. 181 Significantly, both Lopez and 
Morrison expressly rejected the idea that Congress has plenary power to 
decide the subject matter that is within the breadth of its Commerce power 
and also the manner in which that subject matter is to be regulated-even in 
the instance of federal regulation of private activity where Congressional 
authority is at its apex. 182 This is important because, although the U.S. Su-
preme Court has not previously addressed under what circumstances Con-
gress may preempt a non-discriminatory state tax, state courts have previ-
ously opined-in cases that generally pre-date Lopez and Morrison-that 
the analysis to be applied in such cases is mere deference to Congress's 
plenary Commerce Clause power. 183 
Rather than defer to Congress's plenary authority, both Lopez and 
Morrison stated that, applying the principles of the Constitution, it was for 
the Court to inquire whether the intrastate focus of the federal regulation 
was "activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transac-
tion, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate com-
define those terms" and was "not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, 
in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulat-
ed." 514 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added). In Morrison, the Court stated that "[g]ender-
motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity" and "in 
our Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity 
only where the activity is economic." 529 U.S. at 613. 
181. See generally Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
182. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 617 ("'[S]imply because Congress may conclude that a 
particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make It so'" 
(quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., Inc., 452 U.S. 264,311 (1981) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring))); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (same); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. 
at 614 ("'[W]hether particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come 
under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather 
than a legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this Court'" (quoting Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 557, n.2 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 273 
(1964) (Black, J., concurring)))). Compare Wickard, 317 U.S. at. 124 ("'The power of Con-
gress over interstate commerce is plenary and complete in itself, may be exercised to its 
utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitu-
tion."' (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942))). 
183. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Cocreham, 164 So. 2d 314, 322 (La. 1964), (upholding, as 
constitutional, Act ofSept.14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (codified as 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 381-84)); State ex rei. CIBA Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 382 S.W.2d 645, 
657 (Mo. 1964) (en bane) (same); Smith Kline & French Labs. v. State Tax Comm'n, 403 
P.2d 375,380 (Or. 1965) (same). A later 1997 Massachusetts case addressing this same issue 
generally deferred to the reasoning in those prior three state cases. Nat' I Private Truck Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Comm'r, 688 N.E.2d 936, 941 (Mass. 1997). For a discussion of these cases see 
Fatale, supra note 36, at 495-98. 
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merce."184 However, the imposition of a state tax is not an act of "com-
merce," and it is clear that the term "commerce" as set forth in the Com-
merce Clause was not intended to include a reference to the imposition of a 
state tax. 185 
In a later case, Gonzalez v. Raich, 186 the Supreme Court clarified the 
"substantial effects" test as applied in Lopez and Morrison. Raich held that a 
federal statute banning the possession, obtaining, and manufacturing of can-
nabis preempted a state statute that permitted such actions when undertaken 
for personal medical use. 187 Raich re-visited the Court's prior holding in 
Wickard, and distinguished Morrison and Lopez, ruling that even non-
commercial activities that are "purely local" can be made subject to Com-
merce Clause regulation when they "are part of an economic 'class of ac-
tivities"' that in the aggregate have a substantial effect on commerce. 188 
Raich stated that this broader aggregation of commercial and non-
commercial activity permits Congress to determine whether the "'total inci-
dence' of a practice poses a threat to a national market."189 Further, the 
Court specified that for purposes of its test, "economic" activities consist of 
"the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities."190 Howev-
er, unlike in Raich, the imposition of a state tax cannot be aggregated with 
private commercial activity for purposes of the Court's substantial effects 
test, because the imposition of a state tax will never be part of an "economic 
'class of activities"' within the meaning of this test, nor will such taxes ever 
be part ofthe "'total incidence' of a practice."191 
Although Lopez and Morrison specifically evaluated the application of 
the "substantial effects" test, the two cases also stated that apart from such 
fact patterns, Congress has the ability to "regulate the use of the channels of 
interstate commerce" and "to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce." 192 How-
ever, the preemption of a state tax constitutes the regulation of the "states as 
states" and not the regulation of a "channel" or an "instrumentality" of in-
terstate commerce. 193 Further, the Court's case citations in support of these 
184. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614. 
185. See supra note 19 (referencing law review articles with detailed analysis as to 
the meaning of the term "commerce" as set forth within the Commerce Clause). 
186. 545 U.S. I (2005). 
187. /d. at 15, 22. 
188. /d. at 17 (quotes omitted) (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151 
(1971) and Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29). 
189. !d. 
190. ld. at 25-26 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 
(1966)). 
191. /d.at17. 
192. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (199.5); see also United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000). 
193. See supra notes 23 and 145-52 and accompanying text. 
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tests make clear that the Court's verbiage was merely referencing its prior 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, including cases where Congress sought to 
regulate private activity194 and one case, the Shreveport Rate Cases, 195 where 
the Court sanctioned a Congressional statute that preempted a state statute 
that reflected patent discrimination in favor of in-state commercial inter-
ests.196 It does not make sense to read the Lopez and Morrison dicta on the 
regulation of the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce any 
more broadly than a reference to the Court's prior cases because, among 
other things, such an interpretation would be at odds with the actual Morri-
son and Lopez case holdings. 197 Further, the Court's prior cases do not au-
thorize the preemption of a non-discriminatory state tax. 198 
In his concurrence in Raich, a six-to-three decision, Justice Scalia em-
phasized that Congress's regulatory authority over intrastate activities that 
are not themselves part of interstate commerce (including activities that 
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce) derives from the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause. 199 As the imposition of a state tax is not itself part of 
interstate commerce, a preemption of a non-discriminatory state tax would 
194. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1942) and 
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241 (1964) as examples involving the 
regulation ofthe channels of interstate commerce, and Hous. E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United 
States (Shreveport Rate Cases), 234 U.S. 342 (1914); S. Ry. Co. v. United States (Southern 
Railway), 222 U.S. 20 (1911); and Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) as examples 
involving the regulation of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce). Darby and Heart of 
Atlanta are discussed supra at notes 135-36 and 141-43 and accompanying text. Shreveport 
Rate Cases is discussed irifra notes 195-196 and accompanying text. Southern Railway up-
held amendments to the Safety Appliance Act as applied to vehicles used in intrastate com-
merce. See 222 U.S. 20. In Perez, the Court held that the Commerce Clause authorized a 
federal statute that makes it a crime to engage in loan sharking---extortionate credit transac-
tions-at a local level. 402 U.S. 146. Lopez cited Perez for the proposition that Congress 
could regulate as to the "destruction of an aircraft" or as to "thefts from interstate ship-
ments." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (citing Perez, 402 U.S. at 150). Morrison merely repeated the 
case citations stated in Lopez. 529 U.S. at 609 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558). 
195. Hous. E. & W Tex. Ry. Co. (Shreveport Rate Cases), 234 U.S. 342. 
196. The Shreveport Rate Cases evaluated Congress's attempt to regulate a state's 
intrastate shipping rates as charged to a railroad, an attempt to rectify a situation in which the 
state was charging more per mile for an interstate shipment of commodities than for intra-
state shipments. /d.; see irifra note 340, and accompanying text. 
197. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Taming Congress's Power Under the Commerce 
Clause: What Does the Near Future Portend?, 55 ARK. L. REv. 731, 760 (2003) (noting that 
were it construed broadly, the "channels" test would counter-intuitively threaten "the very 
results that Lopez and Morrison fear"). 
198. See generally discussion supra Part II. 
199. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. I, 33-34 (Scalia, J., concurring); see id. at 22 (con-
cluding that "[t]hus, as in Wickard, when it enacted comprehensive legislation to regulate the 
interstate market in a fungible commodity, Congress was acting well within its authority to 
'make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper' to 'regulate Commerce ... among the 
several States"' (quoting U.S. Const. art. I,§ 8, cl. 3)). 
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therefore need to be justified under this Clause. However, the preemption of 
a state tax is not permissible under the substantial effects test because the 
imposition of a state tax cannot be aggregated with private commercial ac-
tivity as would be required for purposes of the application of this test. 200 
Also, Congress's general ability to regulate the channels or instrumentalities 
of interstate commerce-private activity--does not confer the ability to 
preempt a non-discriminatory state tax.201 
Indeed, if one were to somehow conclude that the imposition of a state 
tax were the type of activity or conduct that could be subject to the substan-
tial effects test, then the application of this test would apparently result in 
the counter-intuitive conclusion that virtually every state tax could be 
preempted by Congress since taxes are fundamentally economic in their 
result, and consistent with Wickard and Raich, even small in-state economic 
impact can have the requisite "substantial effect" on interstate commerce.202 
The Congressional authority to preempt state taxes that merely impact the 
channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce-problematically-
would be similarly broad.203 
More fundamentally, the Framers did not intend that the Necessary 
and Proper Clause would be used in a manner that is "repugnant . . . to the 
powers ... assigned to the States," as such usage would not be "proper."204 
200. See supra notes 184-91 and accompanying text. 
20 I . See supra notes 192-98 and accompanying text. 
202. See Michael J. Mcintyre, Thoughts on the Future of the State Corporate Income 
Tax, 25 ST. TAX NOTES 931 (2002) (noting that the states' personal income taxes and sales 
taxes could likely be abolished under a test allowing for the preemption of a state tax im-
posed ·upon interstate commerce, as these taxes affect interstate commerce, and that the 
states' property taxes could possibly be preempted as well). Mcintyre was responding to 
suggestions made by Professor Kirk J. Stark. !d.; cf United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 
613 (2000) (stating if "Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related to the 
economic productivity of individual citizens ... it is difficult to perceive any limitation on 
federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States 
historically have been sovereign. Thus, if we were to accept the Government's arguments, 
we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to 
regulate." (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995))). 
203. See supra note 202. 
204. Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A 
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 299-300 (1993) 
(quoting the comments of Constitutional delegate Fisher Ames shortly after the Constitu-
tion's ratification); see Printz_v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997) ("When a 
'La[w] ... for carrying into Execution' the Commerce Clause violates [other Constitutional 
principles], it is not a 'La[w] ... proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause,' 
and is thus, in the words of The Federalist, 'merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation' which 'de-
serve[s] to be treated as such."' (emphasis in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 33, 
supra note 9, at 172 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999))); United States v. 
Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1967-68 (2010) ("It is of fundamental importance to consider 
whether essential attributes [of federalism embodied in the Constitution] are compromised by 
the assertion of federal power under the Necessary and Proper Clause; if so, that is a factor 
76 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2012:41 
Indeed, in the Federalist Number 33, Hamilton evaluates the breadth of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause and concludes in his penultimate statement 
that, despite this Clause, "the individual States would, under the proposed 
Constitution, retain an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise 
revenue to any extent of which they may stand in need, by every kind of 
taxation, except duties on imports and exports. "205 
Focus on Hamilton's comments in the Federalist logically permits the 
historical analysis in this Article concerning Congress's power to engage in 
substantive regulation under the Commerce Clause to be brought full circle. 
In general, in the Court's Commerce Clause cases leading up to and includ-
ing Lopez and Morrison-beginning with the Court's seminal Commerce 
Clause case, Gibbons v. Ogden206-the Court has evaluated the power of 
Congress to displace a non-protectionist state statute by evaluating whether 
the area of law addressed by the statute is one delegated to Congress, one 
reserved to the states, or an area to be concurrently regulated by both Con-
gress and the states.207 In those latter cases of concurrent regulation where 
most affirmative Commerce Clause cases reside, federal law nearly always 
stands supreme, but Morrison and Lopez evaluated fact patterns that were in 
the middle classification, where the regulatory power at issue was reserved 
to the states. ~ituations in which Congress seeks to preempt a state tax like-
wise fall into this middle classification of state supremacy and are not cir-
cumstances where federal-state concurrent power allows for federal 
preemption, as only a state can impose a state tax.208 
Notably, apart from their specific holdings, the Supreme Court's two 
sets of post-1995 Usery-like cases, New York and Printz, and Lopez and 
Morrison, each emphasized the importance of a separate realm of regulation 
that is sovereign to the states. For example, in New York, the Court noted 
suggesting that the power is not one properly within the reach of federal power.") (Kennedy, 
J., concurring); see also Gary Lawson, A Truism with Attitude: The Tenth Amendment in 
Constitutional Context, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv., 469, 472 (2008) ("[Federal] [l]aws ... 
violate the Tenth Amendment when they interfere with the federalist structure of government 
in such a manner and to such an extent that they are not necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution national power.") (quotes omitted). 
205. THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supra note 9, at 173 (Alexander Hamilton); see also 
supra notes 10-11, 55 and accompanying text. 
206. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); see supra notes 69-77. 
207. Gibbons recognized the possibility for conflict in the latter such cases because 
"when a State· proceeds to regulate commerce with foreign nations, or among the several 
States, it is exercising the very power that is granted to Congress, and is doing the very thing 
which Congress is authorized to do." 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 199-200. 
208. See supra note 23; see also Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 199 (recognizing that 
unlike in the case of federal-state concurrent jurisdiction, "[t]he power of taxation is indis-
pensible to [the states'] existence, and is a power, which, in its own nature, is capable of 
residing in, and being exercised by, different authorities [the state and federal Government] 
at the same time"). 
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that there is a "constitutional line" that separates and distinguishes between 
permissible exercises of state and federal power;209 whereas Printz stated 
that the Constitution establishes "two orders of government, each with its 
own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and 
obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it."210 In addi-
tion, both Lopez and Morrison repeatedly emphasized that the Constitution 
requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly lo-
cal.211 State taxation is in the realm of what is truly local-it is the epitome 
of such actions-and in cases in which the state tax at issue is not protec-
tionist within the meaning of the Commerce Clause, it is not apparent that 
Congress has any authority under the Commerce Clause to preempt that tax. 
III. CONGRESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL FORAYS INTO STATE TAXATION 
PREEMPTION 
The two previous Parts of this Article note the Supreme Court's ana-
lytic progression in its recent affirmative and dormant Commerce Clause 
cases, an effort intended to bring the Court's jurisprudence into closer 
alignment with the text and purpose of the U.S. Constitution.212 However, 
there are pre-existing Congressional preemptions of state taxes that were 
enacted when the Court's affirmative Commerce Clause cases suggested a 
more permissive approach to federal regulation. Also, there are earlier 
dormant Commerce Clause cases that themselves effect a judicial nullifica-
tion of a state tax and/or include dicta that specifically reference the pro-
spect for federal preemption of a state tax. It is therefore important to evalu-
ate the significance of these prior statutory and judicial precedents. In gen-
209. 505 u.s. 144, 155 (1992). 
210. 521 U.S. 898, 920 (1997) (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 
779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
211. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608, 615-16 (2000) (citation omitted); 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 548, 557, 567-68 (1995) (citation omitted). Sensitivity to 
state governmental functions has also characterized the Court's recent dormant Commerce 
Clause cases. See United Haulers Ass'n, Inc., v. Onieda-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 
550 U.S. 330, 344 (2007) ("We should be particularly hesitant to interfere with the Counties' 
efforts under the guise of the [dormant] Commerce Clause because waste disposal is both 
typically and traditionally a local government function") (citation omitted); Dep't of Reve-
nue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328,341-42 (noting municipal bond financing, a practice that 
dates back to the seventeenth century and that plays a vital role in municipal finance, is a 
traditional government function to which the Court's dormant Commerce Clause deference is 
to apply with "even greater force" than the public waste disposal at issue in United Haulers, 
550 U.S. 330); see also United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 342-43 ("But States and municipalities 
are not private businesses-far from it. Unlike private enterprise, government is vested with 
the responsibility of protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens .... These im-
portant responsibilities set state and local government apart from a typical private business.") 
(citation omitted). 
212. See supra Parts I, II. 
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eral, these legal precedents divide into two groupings: (1) statutes and cases 
that address what are generally Due Process concerns and (2) statutes that 
are focused on the elimination of an asserted form of discrimination in 
which the effective claim is not that the states have engaged in some form 
of economic protectionism, but rather have acted to tax one industry group 
less favorably than another industry group. 
A. Public Law 86-272; Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rei. Heitkamp; and 
the Address of Due Process Concerns 
1. Public Law 86-272 
Public Law 86-272213 was the first general Congressional preemption 
of state tax.214 The law prohibits a state from imposing a net income-based 
tax on a corporation when the corporation limits its contact with the taxing 
state to the in-state solicitation of sales of tangible personal property to be 
delivered into the state from a location outside the state.215 
Public Law 86-272 was enacted in response to the Supreme Court's 
decision in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co v. Minnesota ("Port-
land Cement")/ 16 in which the Supreme Court held that a state could impose 
a non-discriminatory, fairly-apportioned income tax as to a corporation do-
ing business in the state merely through in-state sales activity.217 The hold-
ing in Portland Cement had been presaged, if not effectively delivered, in 
the Court's prior cases and reflected an emphatic rejection of the Court's 
· once-held but previously-discarded notion that a state could not tax, or regu-
late, anything other than "intrastate" commerce-generally, manufacturing, 
production, and mining.218 The property sold in Portland Cement was pro-
duced outside the taxing state, where it was merely sold and delivered.219 
Congress took issue with the result in Portland Cement, concluding 
that, despite the decision, the law remained unsettled.22° Congress also con-
cluded that, whether or not the Court's result reflected prior case law, it 
213. Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (1959) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 381-84) 
(West 2010). 
214. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
215. See 15 U.S.C. § 381-84 (2006). 
216. 358 U.S. 450 (1959). 
217. !d. at452. 
218. !d. at 459-61 (discussing the Court's prior cases and stating, among other things, 
that "[w]e believe that the rationale of these cases, mvolving income levies by States, con-
trols the issues here"); see supra notes 83-91 and accompanying text. 
219. !d. at454-57. 
220. See H.R. REP. No. 86-936, at 2 (1959) (stating, that, despite the decision, by a 
six-to-three vote, "it may be argued that the Supreme Court has not yet decisively disposed 
of the precise question of whether solicitation alone is a sufficient activity for the imposition 
of a State income tax upon an out-of-state business"). 
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would come as a surprise to smaller companies that would--even if they 
were aware of it-not be able to sufficiently track their sales such that they 
could reasonably comply.221 The general Congressional notion was that the 
case effected a practical discrimination against these smaller companies that 
would, because of their compliance issues, be disadvantaged vis-a-vis their 
larger competitors, and that Congress should therefore act to eliminate this 
disadvantage.222 However, Public Law 86-272 was generally worded, and its 
application was not limited to smaller companies.223 A primary problem to 
be solved by the Act-permitting smaller companies time to adjust to the 
reasoning of Portland Cement-was something that would resolve itself in 
time. Consistent with this fact, Public Law 86-272 was described as "tempo-
rary" and as a "stop-gap" measure in the Act's legislative history, but the 
law was passed without the inclusion of a sunset date.224 
Elsewhere, this Author has commented in more detail on the problem-
atic history and practical aftermath of Public Law 86-272.225 Though the law 
was the first general preemption of a state tax, and therefore represented a 
highly significant Constitutional moment, the law was introduced, debated, 
and passed in less than six months. 226 Though the law was claimed to be 
221. The Act's legislative history, albeit brief, refers multiple times to the cost of 
compliance that would potentially be imposed upon smaller businesses, which would have 
difficulty with the "maintenance of records" and would have to retain "legal counsel and 
accountants ... familiar with the tax practice of each jurisdiction." H.R. REP. No. 86-936, at 
2 (1959); see also S. REP. No. 86-658, at 2-4 (1959); In re Disney Enters., Inc. v. Tax Ap-
peals Tribunal, 888 N.E.2d 1029, 1037 (NY 2008) (discussing the Act's legislative history). 
A Congressional commission that studied the Act shortly after its enactment stated that the 
problem was that smaller businesses were disadvantaged because they possessed, not "elec-
tronic" equipment, like "larger companies," but rather only the "simplest of machinery such 
as adding machines." H.R. REP. No. 88-1480, at 91 (1964). 
222. See generally S. REP. No. 86-658, at 2-4 (1959); see also Timothy J. Sweeney, 
State Taxation of Interstate Commerce Under Public Law 86-272: "A Riddle Wrapped in an 
Enigma Inside a Mystery," 1984 BYUL. REv. 169, 173-74 (1984) (stating that one perceived 
problem was that "expanded state taxation of interstate commerce would discriminate against 
small business vis-a-vis big businesses" and that therefore "Congress sought a remedy that 
would allow small businesses to compete effectively with large businesses"). 
223. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-384; see also H.R. REP. No. 88-1480, at 438 (stating that 
"the jurisdictional line drawn [by Public Law 86-272] is not one that distinguishes between 
the large and the small"). 
224. Compare S. REP No. 86-658, at 4, 438 (1959) (referring to the law as a "tempo-
rary" or "stop gap" measure), with 15 U.S.C §§ 381-384 (text of the law including no sunset 
date). The House and Senate had drafted competing bills, the former with a sunset date and 
the latter without one; the resulting conference committee chose the Senate bill, in part be-
cause "[u]nlike the House bill, the Senate bill contains no time limitation on the effectiveness 
of the immunity granted in the bill." H.R. REP. No. 86-1 103, at 4 (1959) (Conf. Rep.). 
225. See Fatale, supra note 36. 
226. See Paul J. Hartman, Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Busi-
ness, 75 HARV. L. REV. 953, 1008 (1962) (stating that "[e]ven those who in the main favor 
congressional intervention have criticized the technical draftsmanship exhibited in the act 
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necessary to assist smaller companies, it was lobbied for by bigger compa-
nies, and a Congressional study done after the law's enactment-the type of 
evaluation that would typically precede a law's enactment--concluded that 
the law mostly benefitted these larger companies.227 Consequently, applying 
the notion of discrimination employed by the Act-which does not encom-
pass the type of protectionist acts that the Commerce Clause was directed 
towards-the law actually discriminates against the very taxpayers that it 
was supposed to assist. 228 Congress had thought that larger companies would 
not re-structure their operations to take advantage of the law's provisions, 
and that, therefore, the bill would likely not be very costly to the states. 229 In 
fact, the amount of tax planning that was brought about by Public Law 86-
272, in particular over time, has been enormous. 230 And the fact that the law 
operates largely through definitions that are each subject to multiple inter-
pretations means that the law has resulted in a significant amount of costly 
state litigation.231 Public Law 86-272, though stated to be "temporary," was 
and the abbreviated procedure used in its adoption"); S.REP. No. 86-658, at 12 (1959) (Gore 
and McCarthy minority view) (stating that the bill was "hastily devised" and that there was 
no need for "hasty" action-that what was needed was "proper study by a competent stafF'); 
Fatale, supra note 36, at 475-77. 
227. See Fatale, supra note 36, at 474-84. The later Congressional report concluded, 
among other things, that the conventional view that the law would benefit "primarily ... 
small- and medium-sized businesses" does not "receive support from the data now availa-
ble." H.R. REP. No. 88-1480, at 426. 
228. See infra note 285 and accompanying text; Fatale, supra note 36, at 479-84. 
229. A Congressional Committee report evaluating the law after its enactment noted 
Congress's view that "if small and medium-sized taxpayers would be the primary beneficiar-
ies of the statutory policy, it would appear that the States would not gain significant amounts 
of revenue even if permitted to impose income taxes on the basis of the activities protected 
by the statute." H.R. REP. No. 88-1480, at 422. That same report suggested that Congress did 
not foresee that larger businesses-which because of their resources are better able to engage 
in tax planning-would change their methods of doing business, eliminating in-state "physi-
cal" contacts, to take advantage of the Act's provisions. See id. at 425 (stating that the law's 
enactment was not "expected to be the signal for widespread changes in methods of doing 
business"). 
230. Charles E. McLure, Jr., Legislative, Judicial, Soft Law and Cooperative Ap-
proaches to Harmonizing Corporate Income, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 377, 426 (2008) ("The 
effect ofP.L. 86-272 has been to create an open invitation to tax planning, [to] undermine 
state revenues, and [to] give interstate sellers a competitive advantage over intrastate 
sellers."); William F. Fox & John A. Swain, The Federal Role in State Taxation, A Norma-
tive Approach, 60 NAT'L TAX J. 611,622 (2007) (noting Public Law 86-272 "has been wide-
ly criticized on tax policy grounds" and observing that the law "has the effect of excluding 
otherwise taxable income from the tax base, thus violating principles of equity and neutrali-
ty" and also "encourages tax planning and the associated economic efficiencies"-for exam-
ple, by encouraging "firms to artificially minimize their activities in market states"); see also 
Charles F. Barnwell, State Tax Planning- What's Left?, ST. TAX TODAY, Dec. 21, 2009, at 
242-2 (noting specific past state tax planning techniques effected using the provisions of 
Public Law 86-272 and suggesting some future such tax planning techniques). 
231. See, e.g., Fatale, supra note 36, at 439-40,477. 
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never repealed-nor has there ever even been Congressional consideration 
of such repeal. 232 The continuing existence of the law suggests, among other 
things, that big business and the states do not stand on equal footing in the 
federal legislative process, at least when it comes to state taxes.233 
That Congress may have relied '"upon incomplete information"' in 
enacting Public Law 86-272 does not, without more, suggest that the law is 
constitutionally questionable?34 Rather, the primary constitutional problem 
with Public Law 86-272 is that it is not premised in Commerce Clause con-
cerns. There was no state-based economic protectionism or discrimination, 
as those terms are generally understood, that was addressed by the law. If 
one takes on faith that the law was intended to undo a practical discrimina-
tion effected by Portland Cement vis-a-vis smaller companies, nonetheless 
this discrimination is not discrimination within the meaning of the Com-
merce Clause.235 Indeed, Portland Cement specifically ruled that its holding 
only applied where the tax in question was non-discriminatory, as well as 
fairly apportioned.236 Further, Public Law 86-272 was not an example of 
Congress engaging in the regulation of "[ c ]ommerce ... among the several 
States."237 The law effected no regulation of private commercial actors, not 
even of states acting as commercial actors; the law merely effected a direct 
infringement of a sovereign state right, perhaps the most traditional and 
integral of all such rights, the right to impose taxes. 
232. A Congressional committee established to evaluate state taxation after the en-
actment of the Act concluded in 1964 that the law was unexpectedly costly to the states, 
but-rather than recommending a repeal of the statute-instead recommended that Congress 
consider legislating with respect to the states' corporate income tax apportionment rules to 
minimize this costliness. See Fatale, supra note 36, at 488-90. This suggested subsequent 
legislation never occurred. !d. Professor Kathryn Moore analyzed the Congressional bills 
introduced with respect to multistate corporate taxation for the period 1971 through May 
1996. See Moore, supra note 5, at 179. She found that from 1971 to 1982 "each of the bills 
limited the percentage of multistate business income or capital that states could tax," id. at 
195-96, and that from 1982 to May 1996, the only bills impacting state corporate income 
taxation related to "worldwide unitary taxation." ld. at 198-200 & n.24l. The latter issue is 
not related to the enactment or operation of Public Law 86-272. See id. This Author is famil-
iar with the Congressional history since 1996, and there have been no Congressional attempts 
to repeal Public Law 86-272 since that time. 
233. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. 
234. Cf South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 513 (1988) (rejecting the state's 
claim that a federal statute governing bond issuances could be struck down as applied to a 
state on the theory that the national political process failed in its enactment of the statute as 
suggested by the fact that the law was "imposed by the vote of an uninformed Congress 
relying upon incomplete information"). 
235. Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 452 (1959) ("We 
conclude that net income from the interstate operations of a foreign corporation may be 
subjected to state taxation provided the levy is not discriminatory and is properly apportioned 
to local activities within the taxing State forming sufficient nexus to support the same."). 
236. ld. 
237. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 3. 
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Public Law 86-272, rather than having any logical Commerce Clause 
predicate, was in fact founded in Due Process concerns, i.e., concerning the 
fairness of applying the Supreme Court's holding in Portland Cement to 
smaller taxpayers, especially given their presumed limited ability to com-
ply.238 A high-profile dormant Commerce Clause case decided eight years 
later, National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois,239 
discussed in the next Subpart, would expressly suggest on similar facts per-
taining to the states' interstate application of sales and use taxes that the 
lack of Due Process notice and fairness could also raise a Commerce Clause 
issue. But Public Law 86-272 and Bellas Hess came about during the post-
New Deal era when virtually all private activity and state regulation as to 
such activity was believed to be a potential subject of Commerce Clause 
regulation240-logic that the Supreme Court has since rejected.241 And both 
legal exercises reflect a "free market" approach to the Commerce Clause, 
which also is an approach that the Court has since discarded. 242 
Before turning to Bellas Hess and its troubled offspring, Quill Corp. v. 
North Dakota ex rei. Heitkamp,243 it is worth noting some of the obvious 
difficulties with legislating to address Due Process concerns under the guise 
of the Commerce Clause-all of which are suggested by Public Law 86-
272. As discussed in Part I of this Article, the primary thrust of the Com-
merce Clause is to police state-based economic protectionism. In the classic 
case in which a state has engaged in protectionism, Congress could simply 
legislate to preempt that protectionist act. 244 Significantly, a protectionist 
238. H.R. REP. No. 86-936, at 1-2 (1959) (citing "apprehensions" of"small and mod-
erate size businesses" resulting from the decision in Portland Cement, in part due to the 
presumed higher tax compliance costs that would result from the holding in the case); S. REP. 
No. 86-658, at 2-3 (1959) (noting that "[m]any small- and medium-sized firms" were "fear-
ful of the cost of compliance" resulting from the holding in Portland Cement); see also S. 
REP. No. 86-658, at 4 (1959) (noting that absent the legislation, smaller business might be 
inclined to abandon their interstate markets to the benefit of "larger businesses," which 
would be better able to comply with the Court's holding); supra notes 220-22 and accompa-
nying text. 
239. 386 U.S. 753 (1967). 
240. See generally supra notes 133-44 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's 
progression of cases up through its 1964 affirmation of federal legislation in two civil rights 
cases on Commerce Clause grounds). 
241. See generally supra Part II.B (discussing the Court's cases subsequent to 1985, 
during which time the Court struck down as unconstitutional several acts of Congress that 
were enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause). 
242. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (discussing the renunciation of the 
rule in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946) in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 
u.s. 274 (1977)). 
243. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
244. See, e.g., Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141, 149-51 (1979) (upholding 
Congress's preemption of a New Mexico tax that discriminated against the production of 
electricity within the state's borders for consumption outside the state). 
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state measure would not cease to be protectionist over time, so a Congres-
sional act eliminating the protectionist component of a state regulation 
would be both consonant with and proportional to Congress's Commerce 
Clause authority. But Due Process fairness considerations are not so rigid. 
For example, persons' lack of knowledge or"recent legal developments and 
the absence of inexpensive technology to address such developments-the 
bases for Public Law 86-272-are both issues that resolve themselves over 
time. Addressing such issues pursuant to a Congressional act that preempts 
a state tax, as was done in the context of Public Law 86-272, is overkill, 
certainly once the issue has been resolved, even if the underlying motive is 
initially appropriate. Also, effecting a state tax preemption through rigid 
statutory language that, by necessity, relies upon static definitions only 
compounds the problem because, unlike such statutory language, commer-
cial behavior is subject to change.245 Furthermore, cost estimates with re-
spect to state tax preemptions are unlikely to accurately estimate long-term 
state revenue costs, primarily because commercial behavior changes, and 
therefore the federal rules may come to apply in unexpected ways.246 The 
converse to all of this is that, as Public Law 86-272 demonstrates, once a tax 
break is conferred upon taxpayers, it is very difficult for federal legislators 
to take back that break, in part because taxpayers grow to rely upon the 
break, including through subsequent tax planning. 
2. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rei. Heitkamp 
The judicial equivalent of Public Law 86-272 in the sales and use tax 
area is the legal rule established by the dormant Commerce Clause case, 
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rei. Heitkamp. 247 While Public Law 86-272 
dates back to 1959, during the time that the federal Commerce power was 
accorded its broadest construction, Quill was more recently decided in 
1992.248 But that later date is deceptive because Quill primarily upheld the 
logic set forth in the Court's prior 1967 case, National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. 
245. See supra note 37 (referencing the 2011 AT&T Mobility settlement, wherein a 
successful class action was brought against the states for a tax refund on the basis th,at a 1998 
federal law preempting the application of a state tax applied to a specific type of transaction 
that did not exist at the time the Jaw was enacted). 
246. See supra note 37 (referencing the 2011 AT&T Mobility settlement). The AT&T 
Mobility settlement was the result of the application of a 1998 federal Jaw preempting certain 
state taxes as applied to a very prominent type of transaction that, despite its later promi-
nence, did not exist at the time the Jaw was enacted. This specific revenue cost therefore-
though large-was simply not predicable at the time the law was passed. 
247. 504 U.S. 298. 
248. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, Title I,§ 101,73 Stat. 555 (codified 
as 15 U.S.C. § 381 (2006)); Quill Corp., 504 U.S. 298. 
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Department of Revenue of Illinois249-a case that Quill acknowledged was 
decided before the Court moved on to its more modem Commerce Clause 
reasoning. 250 
The decision in Bellas Hess prohibited the states from imposing a use 
tax collection duty on a mail order vendor where the vendor limits its con-
tacts with the state to communications effected by mail and common carri-
er.251 Bellas Hess was based on a dual determination under the dormant 
Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause concerning whether a mail order 
vendor's connection to a state was sufficient to justify a state's attempt to 
collect use tax.252 The Due Process question was "whether the state has giv-
en anything for which it can ask return"-the longstanding Due Process 
inquiry that continues to be referenced in state tax cases today.253 As to the 
Commerce Clause question, the issue was whether the tax was "justified as 
designed to make such commerce bear a fair share of the cost of the local 
government whose protection it enjoys"-a line of analysis taken from 
Freeman v. Hewit, 254 a case that was effectively overruled in 1977 by Com-
plete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.255 Bellas Hess concluded that the state's 
use tax collection duty as applied to a mail order vendor was not justified 
under these "closely related" questions and emphasized the particular Due 
Process-like burdens, fair notice and compliance difficulty, that arise in the 
context of this duty.256 The Court also noted that "it is difficult to conceive 
249. 368 u.s. 753 (1967). 
250. See, e.g., Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 310 (noting that "Bellas Hess was decided in 
1967, in the middle of[the Court's shifting its Commerce Clause analysis] between formal-
ism and pragmatism"); id. at 311 (noting the Court would not necessarily reach the same 
result if the issue were one of first impression). 
251. See 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967). 
252. See id. at 756. 
253. !d. (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940)); see also 
MeadWestvaco Co. v. Illinois Dep't of Revenue, 553 U.S. 16,25 (2008) (quotmg ASARCO 
. Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307,315 (1982), in tum quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. 
Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940)). 
254. 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946). 
255. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756; cf Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 
U.S. 274, 281 (1977) (referring to the ruling in Freeman "as a triumph of formalism over 
substance, providing little guidance even as to formal requirements"). Quill concluded that 
Complete Auto did not dispense with the Commerce Clause analysis in Bellas Hess, see Quill 
Corp. v. North Dakota ex ref. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 310-11 (1992), but one has to take 
that conclusion with something of a grain of salt, as Quill's primary purpose was to retain 
Bellas Hess on reliance and stare decisis grounds and to clearly posit the case as being sub-
ject to review--on Commerce Clause grounds-by Congress. See infra notes 259-67 and 
accompanying text 
256. These included the fact that there were numerous states and, mostly, local mu-
nicipalities that impose this duty and also that there was great diversity in the underlying 
sales tax exemptions and filing requirements. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 759-60. These burdens 
are much greater in the context of a transaction tax, like the use tax collection duty, as op-
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of commercial transactions more exclusively interstate in character than ... 
mail order transactions"-a fairly transparent reference to the interstate-
intrastate line of Commerce Clause reasoning that the Court had abandoned 
in its prior dormant Commerce Clause cases.257 In its denouement, the Court 
stated that "[t]he very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to ensure a 
national economy free from such unjustifiable local entanglements"-a line 
of reasoning that the Court no longer adheres to. 258 
Although Quill reaffirmed the rule stated in Bellas Hess, the Court 
questioned whether the prior decision had become economically outdated.259 
In particular, the Court concluded that when a mail-order house "is engaged 
in continuous and widespread solicitation of business within a State," this 
vendor "clearly has 'fair warning that [its] activity may subject [it] to the 
jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign. "'260 Further, the Court noted the observa-
tion in the lower state court decision that "advances in computer technology 
greatly eased the burden of compliance with [what was noted in Bellas Hess 
to be] a "'welter of complicated obligations'" imposed by state and local 
taxing authorities."261 As to the Commerce Clause analysis, the Court con-
cluded that, on such facts, "there is no question that ... the use tax is related 
to the benefits [the vendor] receives from access to the State."262 The 
Court's one reference to the economic protectionism principle that is now 
understood to be the purpose underlying its dormant Commerce Clause in-
quiries was a suggestion that its decision was inconsistent with that princi-
ple.263 
posed to an income tax, because the tax reporting applies to individual, continuous sales. See 
id. 
257. /d. at 759; cf supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text. 
258. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 760; cf supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. 
259. For example, the Court noted that it would not necessarily reach the same result 
if the question were one of first impression. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 311. Also, the Court 
initiated its analysis by noting that the lower court, the North Dakota Supreme Court, had 
refused to follow Bellas Hess because it concluded that '"the tremendous social, economic, 
commercial, and legal innovations' of the past quarter-century have rendered [the Bellas 
Hess] holding 'obsole[te]."' /d. at 301 (quoting State ex rei. Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 
N.W.2d 203, 208 (1991)). Quill responded to this critique of Bellas Hess by observing that 
the Court would reverse the North Dakota decision, although it noted that "we agree with 
much ofthe state court's reasoning." /d. at 302. 
260. !d. at 308 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,218 (1977)) (alterations in 
original). 
261. !d. at 303 (quoting State ex rei. Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d at 215). 
262. /d. at 308. 
263. !d. at 304 n.2 (noting the lower state court's observation that, because the "'very 
object' of the Commerce Clause is protection of interstate business against discriminatory 
local practices, it would be ironic to exempt [a mail order vendor] from this burden and 
thereby allow it to enjoy a significant competitive advantage over local retailers" (quoting 
Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d at 214-15)); see John A. Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A 
Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 339 (2003) (noting 
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Although the Court in Quill apparently concluded that there was no 
Due Process or Commerce Clause issue on the facts, it nonetheless reaf-
firmed Bellas Hess on Commerce Clause grounds.264 The Court's Com-
merce Clause analysis was adopted by only five of the eight justices that 
supported the result, but each of these eight justices agreed that the judicial 
notion of "stare decisis" supported the retention of the Bellas Hess rule, 
primarily because the mail order industry affected had grown in reliance on 
it. 265 The Court also noted, similarly, that if it were to strike the constitution-
ality of Bellas Hess in hindsight, the likely result would be "retroactive ap-
plication" of the taxes in question resulting in "substantial unanticipated 
liability for mail order houses."266 Persons who are familiar with the Su-
preme Court proceeding have stated that, as a practical matter, it was on this 
latter, single point that the Quill case tumed.Z67 
The eight Justices who agreed with the Quill result-five in the major-
ity, three in a concurrence-all approved of the fact that by eliminating the 
Due Process underpinnings of Bellas Hess, the Court was making clear that 
Congress could address the virtues of that pre-existing rule under the af-
firmative aspect of the Commerce Clause.268 The majority noted that, prior 
to Quill, Congress may have considered itself restricted in its ability to mod-
ify or eliminate the rule in Bellas Hess because it was uncertain whether 
Congress could encroach upon the Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
Due Process Clause. 269 Although the Court seemed prepared to strike down 
the Bellas Hess rule under both the Due Process and the Commerce Clause, 
it noted that an evaluation of "the burdens" that are imposed by the states' 
how the Quill rule "puts physically present businesses at a competitive disadvantage by 
tilting the economic playing field in favor of mail-order businesses"). 
264. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 306-19. 
265. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 317 (noting that "the Bellas Hess rule has engen-
dered substantial reliance and has become part of the basic framework of a sizable indus-
try"); id. at 320 (Scalia, J., concurring) (agreeing with this statement and noting that "the 
demands of the [stare decisis] doctrine are at their acme ... where reliance interests are in-
volved") (internal quotation marks omitted). 
266. !d. at 318. 
267. See id. at 332 (White, J., dissenting) (speculating that "fears about retroactivity 
are driving the Court's decision in this case"); see also Michael T. Fatale, Geoffrey Sidesteps 
Quill: Constitutional Nexus, Intangible Property and the State Taxation of Income, 23 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 407, 424 n.123 (1994) (noting the comment of one of Quill's attorneys: 
"You know why we won Quill? Because the Attorney General [of North Dakota] stood be-
fore the Court and when Justice O'Connor asked 'What do you intend to do about past liabil-
ity,' said 'We're going to collect every nickel that we're entitled to."'); Billy Hamilton, Re-
membrance of Things Not So Past: The Story Behind the Quill Decision, 59 ST. TAX TODAY, 
March 14,2011, at 807 (discussing the state attorneys' strategy with respect to the retroactiv-
ity issue in Quill, including their conclusion that the Court could have applied existing law 
and struck down Bellas Hess prospectively). 
268. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 318, 320 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
269. See id. at 318. 
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use tax collection duty is one that Congress is "better qualified to re-
solve.'0270 The Court tipped its own view of the issue by stating that, if it 
"overruled" Bellas Hess, it would raise difficult questions concerning the 
retroactivity of the states' use taxes, and that the "precise allocation" of this 
tax burden would be better resolved by Congress.271 It stated that "Congress 
is now free to decide whether, when, and to what extent the States may bur-
den interstate mail-order concerns with a duty to collect use taxes."272 
The dicta in Quill suggesting that Congress has a role with respect to 
state taxation and in particular that Congress can determine "whether" the 
states may "burden" mail order-concerns with a duty to collect use tax has 
caused at least one leading academic to suggest that Congress can broadly 
preempt various state taxes. 273 But attaching that level of significance to this 
single sentence seems unjustified when one considers the unique context in 
which Quill arose, and in particular the fact that the case likely turned on the 
Court's unwillingness to apply retroactive taxes to companies that had re-
lied upon the Court's prior precedent.274 Indeed, it could well be that the 
Court's language merely meant to clarify that Congress could ensure, in 
270. See id. 
271. See id. at 318 n.IO. 
272. !d. at 318; see also Walter Hellerstein, Supreme Court Says No State Use Tax 
Imposed on Mail Order Sellers, For Now, 77 J. TAX'N 120, 123-24 (1992) (stating that the 
Court's language may have been intended, as a practical matter, to elicit a Congressional 
response). 
273. See Walter Hellerstein, A Primer on State Tax Nexus: Law, Power and Policy, 
55 ST. TAX NOTES 555 (2010) (testimony of Professor Walter Hellerstein Before the House 
Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the Committee on Judiciary, Hear-
ing on State Taxation: The Role of Congress in Defining Nexus, February 4, 2010) (citing 
the language from Quill quoted in the text as supporting his conclusion that, with respect to 
positing rules that would govern determinations of state tax nexus, Congress can do "just 
about anything"). Also, in support of this conclusion, Professor Hellerstein cites "the plenary 
scope of the Congressional commerce power" and his conclusion that the Court's recent 
federalism cases "do not seriously inhibit the extensive power that Congress plainly possess-
es to deal with the problems raised by state taxes affecting interstate commerce, and, in par-
ticular, state tax nexus rules." !d. at 6-8. But see supra note 182 and accompanying text. In an 
earlier article, Professor Hellerstein noted, as to this later point, that the Court's recent feder-
alism cases do not specifically pertain to state taxes, something that is undeniable, but which 
the Author would contend misses the thrust of what those cases portend in the state tax area. 
See generally Walter Hellerstein, Federal Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Pow-
er to Legislate Regarding State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 1307 
(2000); see also supra note 20 (referencing earlier, similar Congressional testimony of Pro-
fessor Hellerstein). 
274. See Charles Rothfeld et al., Quill: Confusing the Commerce Clause, 3 ST. TAX 
NOTES Ill (1992) (attorney that filed an amicus brief in the case concludes Quill was "a 
political decision" responding to concerns about retroactivity and the practical consequences 
of overruling Bellas Hess and was not meant "to be taken very seriously"); see also Swain, 
supra note 263, at 341 (concluding Quill is really more of "a regulatory burdens case, not a 
tax case"). 
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addressing Quill, that retroactive taxes could not be collected, and that the 
future collection of sales and use taxes from out-of-state vendors was to be 
made only by states that had endeavored to simplify their taxes, consistent 
with Quill's Due Process concerns. Any other interpretation would seem to 
be inconsistent with the Court's modern understanding of the Commerce 
Clause-an understanding that did not inform the result in Bellas Hess and 
that therefore is generally missing in Quill-including the notion that '"[i]t 
was not the purpose of the [C]ommerce [C]lause to relieve those engaged in 
interstate commerce from their just share of [the] state tax burden even 
though it increases the cost of doing business. "'275 While this notion has 
been referenced by the Court only in its dormant Commerce Clause cases, 
the dormant and affirmative Commerce Clause are animated by identical 
purposes. 
As a rule based in Due Process concerns, the Quill rule reflects all of 
the same problems as Public Law 86-272, discussed in the previous Sub-
part.276 For example, the sales tax burden of compliance that formed the 
basis for the 1967 case, Bellas Hess, and that was noted to be less of a bur-
den at the time of Quill in 1992, is even less of a burden today because, 
among other things, easily-accessible computer technology can sufficiently 
determine the taxes due in various jurisdictions.277 Also, as it is a judicial 
rule and not a statute, the Quill rule does not consist of statutory terms that 
require definition, yet the rule consists of a nexus standard, "physical pres-
ence," that had not been previously mentioned in Bellas Hess. This newly-
created "physical presence" standard quickly became the subject of exten-
sive state tax planning and voluminous state court litigation278---even out-
275. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 310 n.5 (quoting Commonwealth Edison Co. v. 
Montana, 486 U.S. 609, 623-24 (1981)); see also supra notes 96, 116 and accompanying text 
(referencing similar statements in other Supreme Court cases). 
276. See supra notes 243-46 and accompanying text. 
277. See, e.g., Robert D. Plattner, Daniel D. Smirlock & Mary Ellen Ladouceur, A 
New Way Forward for Remote Vendor Sales Tax Collection, 55 ST. TAX NOTES 187 (2010) 
(quoting one large Internet vendor's CEO as stating, "We collect and provide to each of the. 
states the correct sales tax. There are vendors that specialize in this .... It's not very hard.") 
(citation omitted); see also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rei. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 332 
(1992) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating, "[T]he costs of compli-
ance with the [states' use tax collection duty], in light oftoday's modern computer and soft-
ware technology, appear to be nominal."). 
278. See Swain, supra note 263, at 339 (noting how Quill "encourages businesses to 
artificially structure themselves to avoid tax"); Quill, 504 U.S. at 329 (White, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) ("Also very questionable is the rationality of perpetuating a 
rule that creates an interstate tax shelter for one form of business-mail-order sellers but no 
countervailing advantage for its competitors"). A recent Wall Street Journal article com-
mented on how the large Internet company, Amazon, engages in specific tax-motivated 
practices that are lacking in any business justification to ensure that the company does not 
create the "physical presence" in a state that would cause it to lose the protection of the Quill 
"physical presence" safe harbor. See Stu Woo, Amazon Battles States Over Sales Tax, WALL 
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side the sales tax area in which Quill itself was decided.279 And of course 
there is no better example than Quill as to how changing technology can 
magnify the tax implications of a static tax preemption, as Quill now pro-
tects a staggering amount of Internet sales from being subject to state tax-
when there was effectively no such thing as Internet sales at the time that 
the case was decided.280 Quill also demonstrates the difficulties with elimi-
nating a state tax preemption once a preemption has been created-as the 
Court itself was unwilling to overrule its twenty-five-year-old decision in 
Bellas Hess, given the fact that taxpayers had previously relied upon it. 
3. The Address of Due Process Considerations 
The purpose of the Commerce Clause, to police state-based economic 
protectionism, does not support the preemption of a state tax on Due Pro-
cess grounds.281 Further, the text of the Commerce Clause, which allows the 
regulation of "commerce" among the states, does not support the preemp-
tion of a non-discriminatory state tax in any instance.282 Therefore, the en-
actment of Public Law 86-272 and the judicial pronouncement in Quill are 
both inconsistent with the Commerce Clause. 
Neither Public Law 86-272 nor Quill are predicated on an attempt to 
prevent a state from favoring in-state interests over out-of-state interests 
and, conversely, both rules undo state law that otherwise would apply uni-
form, non-discriminatory rules to in-state and out-of-state interests. Public 
Law 86-272 was generally intended to protect smaller companies engaged 
in interstate commerce from the application of state taxes in a context in 
which it was presumed that they would not necessarily know the states' rule 
or be easily able to comply-a circumstance where these smaller companies 
were thought to be practically disadvantaged vis-a-vis their larger competi-
tors.283 Quill reaffirmed the Bellas Hess rule that protected a specific type of 
interstate seller-generic mail order vendors without any in-state opera-
STREET J., Aug. 3, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424053111904772304576 
468753564916130.html. Specifically, the company carefully monitors and controls its em-
ployees to ensure that they do not perform certain activities in states in which the company 
wants to avoid the collection of sales tax, i.e., to ensure that these persons do not create what 
Quill referred to as an in-state "physical presence." 
279. For a general discussion of the litigation activity in both the sales and income tax 
areas in the aftermath of Quill, see Michael T. Fatale, State Tax Jurisdiction and the Mythical 
"Physical Presence" Constitutional Standard, 54 TAX LAW. I 05, 106 (2000). 
280. A study by economists at the University of Tennessee concluded that the states 
will collectively lose $10.1 to $11.3 billion in sales tax for the 2012 tax year because of the 
rule in Quill. See Donald Bruce, William F. Fox & LeAnn Luna, State and Local Sales Tax 
Revenue Losses from £-Commerce, 52 ST. TAX NOTES 537 (2009). 
281. See supra Part I. 
282. See supra Part II. 
283. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text. 
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tions-from the application of the states' sales and use tax collection duties, 
a rule that was based on similar compliance concerns.284 Public Law 86-272 
effectively backfired, generally favoring larger companies over smaller 
companies/85 whereas Quill created what may have turned into an unintend-
ed favoritism for certain mail order vendors, and later Internet vendors, at 
the expense of other similar vendors that merely pursued different business 
models.286 In any event, the goals reflected in Public Law 86-272 and 
Quill-whether they were achieved or not-are simply not the goals that the 
Constitutional Framers directed themselves towards in drafting the Com-
merce Clause. 
The Supreme Court's recent approach to the dormant Commerce 
Clause supports the conclusion that the preemption of a state tax based on 
Due Process considerations is inconsistent with the Commerce Clause. The 
Court has recently emphasized the policing of economic protectionism as 
the purpose of the Commerce Clause and has, for example, moved away 
284. See supra notes 251-56 and accompanying text. Quill concluded that the Court's 
prior decision in National Bellas Hess v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 368 U.S. 753 
(1967), remained "good law." 504 U.S. at 317. Bellas Hess pertained to "an out-of-state 
mail-order house," id. at 301, and stood "for the proposition that a vendor whose only con-
tacts with the taxing State are by mail or common carrier" could not be required by such state 
to collect sales or use tax. /d. at 311. The Court's holding in Quill was justified in part by the 
fact that the Court presumed that the mail order industry had relied upon-and achieved 
"dramatic growth"-in part based upon its prior holding in Bellas Hess. /d. at 316-18. 
285. The fact that Public Law 86-272 benefitted primarily larger companies-rather 
than the intended smaller companies-was apparent shortly after the law was enacted. See, 
e.g., H.R. REP. No. 88-1480, at 428 (1964) ("[J]nsofar as the supporters of the statute be-
lieved that the law would be beneficial primarily to small businesses, they appear to have 
been mistaken."); id. at 426 ("Among the supporters of Public Law 86-272, the view also 
seems to have been widely held that the protection given by the statute would be of value 
primarily to small- and medium-sized businesses. This view of the statute's impact, however, 
does not receive support from the data now available."). This unintended result followed in 
part because larger businesses, because of their size, are better able to engage in tax planning. 
See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text. Also, some small businesses are not inter-
state in nature, and hence have no capacity to take advantage of the law's tax planning possi-
bilities. See S. REP. No. 86-658, at 10 (I 959) (Gore and McCarthy minority view) (stating 
that, Public Law 86-272, "if enacted into law, will discriminate against many small business-
es. How can the typical small business, domiciled in and taxed upon its profits by a state, 
compete with a large multistate operator who pays no state income taxes where he sells his 
products?"); see also Paul J. Hartman, Developments in the Law-Federal Limitations on 
State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARV. L. REV. 953, I 009 (1962) ("The act prevents 
the states from reaching the income of numerous large-scale multi state enterprises, for which 
the cost of compliance is not a significant deterrent to conducting business and which are 
capable of limiting their marketing activities so as to come within the statute while realizing 
substantial revenues from sales into the state."). 
286. The rule in Quill puts "physically present" businesses at a competitive disad-
vantage by tilting the playing field in favor of mail order and Internet businesses that can sell 
into a state without making use of any in-state stores or personnel. See supra notes 263, 278 
and accompanying text. 
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from applying the four prongs of Complete Auto in favor of an approach 
that focuses merely on Complete Auto's discrimination test.287 Further, the 
Court has not taken a nexus case since it created the judicial rule in Quill 
and generally no longer even makes reference to the four-part Complete 
Auto test, which includes the nexus standard pursuant to which a state's 
ability to impose tax is evaluated.288 This trend is consistent with the Court's 
attempt to re-position its dormant Commerce Clause analysis within the 
actual intention embodied in the Commerce Clause. 289 As noted by Profes-
sor Jesse Choper and Tung Yin, it does not make sense to "interpret the 
Commerce Clause to require a separate nexus more stringent than that im-
posed by the Due Process Clause because that is not required to further pro-
tect interstate commerce against state taxes that accord a preference to local 
enterprises. "290 
The four prongs of Complete Auto, the tests that the Court has posited 
to evaluate a state tax in the dormant Commerce Clause context, also in-
clude a test that determines whether the state tax is fairly apportioned, 
which the Supreme Court recently evaluated in MeadWestvaco Co. v. Illi-
nois Department of Revenue.291 The fair apportionment concept is also argu-
ably inconsistent with the economic protectionism rationale embodied in the 
Commerce Clause and, similar to the nexus analysis in Bellas Hess and 
Quill, has antecedents in Court cases applying the Due Process clause.292 
287. See discussion supra l.C. 
288. See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text. 
289. See discussion supra I.C, I. D. 
290. Choper & Yin, supra note 108, at 213. The authors state also that Quill is prob-
lematic because, although it purports to differentiate the "substantial nexus" prong of Com-
plete Auto from the Due Process minimum contacts requirement, it provides no guidance as 
to the difference. ld. at 202. The authors would abandon the substantial nexus requirement in 
favor of a minimum contacts standard. !d. at 242. See Swain, supra note 263, at 342 (stating 
that the ruling in Quill that a taxpayer's jurisdictional nexus with the state must include a 
Commerce Clause dimension as well as a Due Process dimension "makes it difficult to know 
how to fill Commerce Clause nexus with content" as "[m]ost of the nexus 'burdens' that 
come to mind are also due process concerns: notice, forseeability, fundamental fairness, and 
the like"); Moore, supra note 107, at 1448 (stating that the Supreme Court in Quill did not 
"explain adequately why the Commerce Clause requires a different nexus standard than that 
required under the Due Process Clause"); see also John A. Swain, Misalignment of Substan-
tive and Enforcement Tax Jurisdiction in a Mobile Economy: Causes and Strategies for 
Realignment, 63 NAT'L TAX J. 925, 943 (2010) (arguing for "the alignment of substantive 
[i.e., tax] and enforcement jurisdiction" and noting that the "major impediments" are "most 
notably the Quill physical presence test and the 'solicitation of orders' safe-harbor of P.L. 
86-272"). 
291. 553 U.S. 16, 25, 32 (2008). The Court's disposition in MeadWestvaco was large-
ly a remand for further state proceedings. ld. 
292. See, e.g., Trinova Corp. v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358,373 (1991) 
("The Complete Auto test[s], while responsive to Commerce Clause dictates, encompas[s] as 
well the due process requirement that there be a 'minimal connection' between the interstate 
activities and the taxing State, and a rational relationship between the income attributed to 
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However, fair apportionment-if not a measure of economic protectionism 
as such-is at least closer to that concept than is the nexus concept, as in 
any case where the state's apportionment computation overreaches, it could 
potentially subject interstate commerce to more than 100% taxation, and 
therefore put such commerce at a disadvantage relative to commerce that is 
in-state only.293 Further, significantly, whatever the Court's or Congress's 
ability to provide parameters as to the states' apportionment rules, general-
ly-speaking the address of these rules would not result in the type of affront 
to state sovereignty that is occasioned by an outright preemption of a state 
tax.294 
the State and the intrastate values of the enterprise."). Professor Donald S. Regan has stated 
that "the Court's insistence that taxes levied on interstate enterprises must be fairly appor-
tioned cannot be explained by reference to the [Commerce Clause's] anti-protectionism 
principle or any variant of that principle" though he has noted that "[t]he Court has located 
the roots of the fair apportionment idea both in the commerce clause and the due process 
clause." See Regan, supra note 56, at 1185-86. 
293. Fair apportionment is an issue that is generally unique to the taxation of multi-
state business income because states that impose a sales and use tax invanably offer a use tax 
credit for a sales tax paid in another state. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 641, §7(c). Port-
land Cement, which heralded the later advent of the Court's modern Commerce Clause juris-
prudence, held that a state could apply a non-discriminatory, fairly apportioned tax to a cor-
poration doing business in the state. 358 U.S. 450, 452 (1959); see supra notes 88-91 and 
accompanying text. In a later case, Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 279-80 (1978), 
the Court upheld the state's use of an apportionment methodology that conflicted with that of 
a neighboring state, but expresse9 some concern that differing state apportionment methods 
could subject states to "duplicative" or "multiple" taxation on the same income. Professor 
Regan has argued that the fair apportionment requirement, if not a protectionism principle 
per se, "is necessary to avoid a situation in which businesses that operate in more than one 
state are taxed more heavily, just because they operate in more than one state, than business 
operating in a single state." See Regan, supra note 56, at 1186; see also Bradley W. 
Joondeph, The Meaning of Fair Apportionment and the Prohibition of Extraterritorial State 
Taxation, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 149, 159-61 (2002) (stating that the fair apportionment re-
quirement is a "lower order" constitutional requirement because it serves only to police the 
more important Commerce Clause and Due Process concerns that are reflected in the Com-
plete Auto tests, specifically state discrimination and nexus). 
294. Moorman stated in dicta that "[i]t is clear that the legislative power granted to 
Congress by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution would amply justify the enactment of 
legislation requiring all States to adhere to uniform rules for the division of income," but 
stated also that in so doing Congress would have to balance "the interests of all affected 
States." 437 U.S. at 280. As a practical matter, while federal bills to preempt state tax have 
proliferated in recent years, these bills do not usually address multiple taxation, the issue that 
elicits the Moorman fair apportionment concern, since the larger companies that support the 
preemption bills engage in tax planning with respect to the states' apportionment and other 
rules--like with respect to Public Law 86-272, see supra note 230 and accompanying 
text-such that they are taxed on less than 100% of their income rather than more than I 00% 
of their income. See Moore, supra note 5, at 196-98. The current proposed federal bill that 
would expand the provisions of Public Law 86-272 does include a provision that would 
strike down a particular apportionment principle used by the states-the use of so-called 
"Finnigan" apportionment--but that bill makes no pretense towards attempting to address 
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State tax preemption statutes that are grounded in what are generally 
Due Process considerations are not supported by the language and purpose 
of the Commerce Clause and the Supreme Court's contemporary Commerce 
Clause analysis. Nonetheless, some such statutes, like Public Law 86-272 
and the Internet Tax Freedom Act,295 have been enacted under the Com-
merce Clause and remain as law.296 Quill suggests that the Court would be 
reluctant to overturn a state tax preemption that has been relied upon by 
taxpayers irrespective of the law's merits as viewed in hindsight.297 And, 
moreover, it may be that the Court would be reluctant to completely fore-
close similar, future Congressional enactments in which a state tax is 
preempted based on what are generally Due Process rather than Commerce 
Clause concerns. 298 If either or both of these latter points are true, it nonethe-
less remains the case that a Due Process-based Congressional preemption of 
a state tax should be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny because such 
the states' apportionment rules more generally. See Governors Urge Congress to Oppose 
BAT Nexus Legislation, ST. TAX TODAY, Aug. 4, 2011, at 151-1 (referencing this proposed 
bill and its apportionment proposal). 
295. The Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 U.S.C. § !51 (1998). This Act has been ex-
tended three times and is currently on extension to 2014. See Act of Oct. 31, 2007, Pub. L. 
No. 110-108, 121 Stat. 1024 (amending the Internet Tax Freedom Act). There have been 
recent attempts to make the law permanent. See, e.g., S. 135, !12th Cong. (2011 ); see infra 
notes 318, 319 and accompanying text (discussing the original Act and the subsequent legis-
lative activity with respect thereto). 
296. Another example is the 1995 State Income Taxation of Pension Income Act, 
which preempts state income tax imposed upon certain retirement income of non-residents 
derived from these persons' prior employment within the state. Pub. L. No. 104-95, 109 Stat. 
979 ( 1996). As the persons to whom the law applies are no longer even engaged in com-
merce, the Act's relationship to the free flow of interstate commerce seems undeniably tenu-
ous-and in fact Due Process-like fairness issues dominated the legislative debate. See gen-
erally Kaye, supra note 32, at 167-77; Moore, supra note 5, at 183-86; cf Gonzalez v. Raich, 
545 U.S. I, 25-26 (2005) ("economic" activity within the meaning of the Commerce Clause 
refers to "the production, distribution and consumption of commodities"). 
297. Quill cited as one fact that supported the re-affirmation of the Court's prior 
decision in Bellas Hess that "we have, in our decisions, frequently relied on the Bellas Hess 
rule in the last 25 years ... and we have never intimated in our review of sales or use taxes 
that Bellas Hess was unsound." 504 U.S. 298, 317 (1992). Somewhat similarly, the Supreme 
Court has twice revisited Public Law 86-272 to evaluate questions about the law's intended 
application-though it has never considered the law's constitutionality. See Wise. Dep't of 
Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214 (1992); Heublein, Inc. v. S.C. Tax 
Comm'n, 409 U.S. 275, 280 (1972). Quill also referred to the enactment of 86-272 as sup-
porting its decision. 504 U.S. at 316 n.9. 
298. See Paul J. Hartman, Collection of the Use Tax on Out-of-State Mail-Order 
Sales, 39 VAND. L. REV. 993, 1022-28 (1986) (noting that if judicial evaluations like that in 
Bellas Hess were considered to be in the nature of Due Process, then arguably Congress 
would have no way of eliminating or modifying such evaluations when it disagreed with 
them, a result that the Court would not favor); see also Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 318 (theoriz-
ing that Congress may have refrained from addressing the Court's Bellas Hess decision in the 
aftermath of that case because of"respect" for the Court's Due Process analysis therein). 
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enactments do not reflect the language or purpose of the Commerce Clause 
and because, as has been mentioned, such enactments-given the difficul-
ties they invariably raise299-tend to be particularly intrusive with respect to 
the states' sovereignty. 
The specific problems occasioned by a state tax preemption effected 
pursuant to the Commerce Clause where the legislation generally reflects 
Due Process concerns includes, for example, overbroad application, rigid 
statutory language that inevitably results in unexpected costs as well as vo-
luminous litigation, and needlessly long terms that are difficult to terminate 
once the law is enacted.300 These specific problems suggest that an appropri-
ate judicial standard of review would be one that evaluates the legitimacy of 
both the intended legislative aim and the chosen legislative means. One 
possible judicial standard would be the "congruence and proportionality" 
standard, which the Supreme Court adopted in 1997 in City of Boerne v. 
Flores301 to evaluate Congressional actions taken in furtherance of Con-
gress's enforcement powers under Article 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.302 Under Article 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has the 
authority to authorize private rights of action against the states for a viola-
tion of the principles of the Fourteenth Amendment, which includes the Due 
Process Clause as made applicable against the states. 303 However, when 
Congress authorizes such a private right of action it must demonstrate that 
there is "congruence and proportionality" between the legitimate problem 
that it has chosen to address and the means that it has selected to do so, or 
the statute will not stand. 304 
Boerne was based on the idea that a private right of action conferred 
under Article 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment ceases to be remedial within 
the meaning of that provision and becomes a substantive act of regulation 
299. See supra notes 243-46 and accompanying text. 
300. See supra notes 243-46 and accompanying text. 
30 I. 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). 
302. Boerne's "congruence and proportiOnality" requirement replaced the previous 
rule stated in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966), that the Equal Protection 
Clause "is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion 
in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Four-
teenth Amendment." See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527-29. Katzenbach had stated, '"Let the end 
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropri-
ate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter 
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."' 384 U.S. at 650 (quoting McCullough v. 
Madison, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat), 316,421 (1819)). 
303. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (stating, "[N]or shall any state deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without the due process of law"); id. § 5 ("The Congress shall 
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."). 
304. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. In Boerne, the statute in question, a provision set forth 
in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, was determined to be disproportionate in 
its effects compared to its objective and was thereby struck down. !d. at 532. 
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on the part of Congress when the action is not congruent with or proportion-
al to Congress's authority-including with respect to the Due Process 
Clause as set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment.305 Although state tax 
preemptions that are purported to be based on the Commerce Clause do not 
raise the historical concerns that underlie Article 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, they nonetheless raise similar, significant sovereignty con-
cerns. When a state tax preemption is proposed based generally on Due Pro-
cess considerations that can also be fairly posited as similarly raising a 
Commerce Clause issue, it should be the case that Congress is held to the 
Bourne-like standard of making clear how the Due Process concern engen-
ders a "threat to a national market,"306 and also of limiting its legislative 
remedy to the narrow address of that specific problem. Absent such a rule, 
similar to the concerns that justified Bourne, Congress could use state tax 
preemptions merely to effectuate federal preferences, as opposed to per-
forming its Constitutional function to protect the national economy.307 
Boerne emphasized the importance of respect for the federal-state constitu-
tional "balance.mos State tax preemptions raise similar concerns, and per-
haps even greater concerns, given the importance of the states' taxing func-
tion.309 
It may seem late in the day for the Court to announce a standard of re-
view for certain Commerce Clause cases in which Congress preempts a 
state tax. But the rule in Boerne is itself recent, and the Court has posited 
several other federalism rules in recent years to rein in federal power, such 
as the commandeering principle applied in New York and Printz.310 Indeed, 
another area where the Court has recently engaged in positing new federal-
ism principles is in the area of state sovereign immunity, where the Court 
has acted to narrow the circumstances in which Congress can authorize suits 
for damages against the states, on the theory that such actions burden the 
states with costly litigation and can result in judgments that threaten the 
305. !d. at 519-20. 
306. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. I, 17 (2005); see Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex 
rei. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 310 n.5 ("'It was not the purpose of [the] [C]ommerce [C]Iause 
to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of [the] state tax burden 
even though it increases the cost of business."' (quoting Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Mon-
tana, 486 U.S. 609,623-24 (1981))). 
307. See Elisabeth Zoller, Congruence and Proportionality for Congressional En-
forcement Powers: Cosmetic Change or Velvet Revolution?, 78 IND. L.J. 567, 578 (2003) 
(noting the view of some scholars that the congruence and proportionality test "is nothing but 
a reaffirmation of the means-end test invented by [Chief Justice] Marshall in McCulloch v. 
Maryland to review the constitutionality of implied powers"). 
308. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. 
309. See supra notes 3, 9-11, 55 and accompanying text. 
310. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 
521 U.S. 898 (1997); see also supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text. 
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states' treasuries. 311 Identical concerns are also prevalent when Congress 
acts to preempt a state tax, and therefore similar safeguards of federalism 
would be appropriate. 312 Further, as has been discussed, the creation of such 
principles would be consistent with the text and purpose of the relevant pro-
visions of the Constitution-which is the line of analysis that has been the 
basis for the Court's new federalism rules.313 
If one is to apply the congruence and proportionality test to Public 
Law 86-272, the law should be struck down as unconstitutional. This is 
because, assuming the Act's asserted goal to protect small companies from 
the compliance difficulties implicated by the Court's holding in Portland 
Cement is a legitimate Commerce Clause goal, the Act is not proportional to 
this goaP14 The Court might be reluctant to strike down Public Law 86-272 
311. Professor William F. Carter has argued that "Boerne and its progeny" derive in 
part from the Court's Eleventh Amendment State sovereign immunity cases. William M. 
Carter, Jr., Judicial Review of Thirteenth Amendment Legislation: "Congruence and Propor-
tionality" or "Necessary and Proper," 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 973, 979-80 (2007); see Seminole 
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996) (observing that the Eleventh Amendment was 
"to avoid 'the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at 
the instance of private parties") (quotes omitted). The Eleventh Amendment prevents Con-
gress from authorizing private actions against the states in federal court. In a case decided 
after Seminole Tribe, the Court concluded that the Tenth Amendment bars Congress from 
authorizing a private suit for money damages against a non-consenting state in state court. 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). Alden noted that "[a] general federal power to author-
ize private suits for money damages would place unwarranted strain on the States' ability to 
govern in accordance with the will of their citizens." I d. at 750-51. Both Seminole Tribe and 
Alden noted that the notion of state sovereign immunity is implicit in the Constitution even 
apart from the Eleventh and Tenth Amendments. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 
U.S. 44,54 (1996); Alden, 527 U.S. at 713-14; cf United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer 
Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330,343 (2007) (expressing concern that finding against 
the state in a dormant Commerce Clause case alleging a state engaged in impermissible 
discrimination by favoring state trash facilities "would lead to unprecedented and unbounded 
interference by the courts with state and local government"). 
312. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 765 
(2002) ("While state sovereign immunity serves the important function of shielding state 
treasuries and thus preserving the States' ability to govern in accordance with the will of 
their citizens, the doctrine's central purpose is to accord the States the respect owed them as 
joint sovereigns.") (quotes omitted); see generally John F. Manning, Federalism and the 
Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2005 (2009) 
(discussing the Court's '"new federalism' cases"). 
313. Professor John F. Manning has stated that "the Court has evidently concluded 
that, if modem Commerce Clause doctrine threatens its minimum conception of state sover-
eignty, it will handle the problem by recognizing implied limitations in federal power that are 
traceable to some form of historically reconstructed original understanding of the appropriate 
federal-state balance." See Manning, supra note 312, at 2024-25. He states further that in 
creating its "new federalism" rules the Court has "sought to root its understanding of consti-
tutional meaning ... [as] drawn from the constitutional structure as a whole." /d. at 2025. 
314. See supra notes 220-33 and accompanying text. This Author made a similar 
argument that 86-272 is unconstitutional in a prior article. See generally Fatale, supra note 
36. 
Implicit Constitutional Limitations 97 
given that it has a long history and "has engendered substantial reliance"-
the Court's verbiage in Qui/P 15-mostly by big companies engaged in ag-
gressive state tax planning.316 But even if that is so, it is nonetheless the case 
that the Court should strike down as unconstitutional any attempt to expand 
the provisions of Public Law 86-272.317 Such an expansion of Public Law 
86-272 would be similarly inconsistent with modern Commerce Clause doc-
trine and, unlike Public Law 86-272, would not raise any reliance concerns. 
If one were to apply the congruence and proportionality test to the In-
ternet Tax Freedom Act, which was enacted in 1998 and has been extended 
three times-most recently to 2014318-the result should be the same. The 
Act was intended to eliminate taxes on Internet access fees as well as "dis-
criminatory" taxes and the consequence of "multiple taxation"-all for the 
asserted purpose of protecting a once-fledgling industry.319 But the Internet 
was likely not in need of protection in 1998 and certainly does not need that 
315. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex ret. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 317 (1992). 
316. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. On the other hand, it would seem 
that, as suggested by Justice White in his dissent in Quill, the Court could strike down 86-
272 on a prospective basis rather than on a retroactive basis and thereby minimize reliance 
concerns. 504 U.S. at 332 (White, J. dissenting) (stating that the Court could have worked 
around the prospect of retroactive taxes had it overruled Bellas Hess); see also Bradley Scott 
Shannon, The Retroactive and Prospective Application of Judicial Decisions, 26 HARV. J.L. 
& Pus. PoL'Y 811, 857 n.216 (2003) (discussing the prospect, suggested by Justice White's 
dissent in Quill, that Quill could have overruled the prior case, Bellas Hess, prospectively on 
the theory that the Court's holding was creating a "new principle of law"); Chevron Oil Co. 
v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1971) (stating that a "new principle of law" may be denied 
retroactive effect to avoid injustice or hardship); Fatale supra note 36, at 451 n.68 (noting 
instances where the Supreme Court did not hesitate to strike down long-standing federal 
statutes as unconstitutional). 
317. See supra note 7 (referencing a recent such legislative attempt). Professors 
McLure and Hellerstein have argued that such an extension "would expand the scope for the 
creation of nowhere income, and thus aggravate the opportunities for tax planning and the 
revenue loss created by Public Law 86-272." See Charles E. McLure & Walter Hellerstein, 
Congressional Intervention in State Taxation: A Normative Analysis of Three Proposals, 31 
ST. TAX NOTES 721 (2004). 
318. See The Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1998), as most recently 
extended to 2014 by the Internet Tax Freedom Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. II 0-108, 121 Stat. 
I 024 (2007). 
319. Professors McLure and Hellerstein noted back in 2004 that the "argument for 
exempting Internet access is no longer valid, if it ever was" and that, with over two billion 
users at the time of their writing, the notion that the Internet was an "infant industry" was 
"ludicrous." McLure & Hellerstein, supra note 317, at 728. As they further note, the Act's 
concept of "discrimination" seemed to simply be a nexus prohibition since "[there are] no 
taxes of which we are aware that single out transactions in electronic commerce for invidious 
treatment." /d. at 726. Further, the "multiple taxation" provisions are "not a model of clarity" 
reading "more like cocktail party conversation than a carefully thought-out restraint on state 
taxing power." !d. at 726. 
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protection now--despite recent attempts to make the law permanent.32° Fur-
ther, the manner in which a federal preemption bill can have expensive un-
anticipated consequences to the states was amply demonstrated by the In-
ternet Act in 2011, when, by reason of the Act, a class action determined 
that the states potentially owed over $1 billion in refunds for sales tax col-
lected with respect to the sale of data access plans-transactions that did not 
exist when the law was originally enacted.321 
B. Discrimination and Economic Protectionism 
Congress can of course act to remedy state-based economic protec-
tionism by preempting a discriminatory state tax.322 Further, when Congress 
is acting pursuant to the affirmative Commerce Clause, it has the right to 
conclude that a particular type of state tax is impermissibly discriminatory 
even if the Court itself has concluded otherwise, given that it has greater 
investigative powers.323 However, as discussed in Part I of this Article, state-
based discrimination has a specific meaning under the Commerce Clause, 
and while Congress may conclude that there is a violation of this principle 
when the Court has concluded otherwise, Congress has no constitutional 
license to take the concept itself and to twist it into something that it was not 
intended to be.324 In particular, Congress has no constitutional license to 
preempt a particular type of state tax on the basis that it discriminates 
against an industry, and therefore burdens that industry vis-a-vis another 
320. See S. REP. No. 105-104, at 21 (1998) (Dorgan minority view concerning the 
Act) (stating that "[t]here is no policy justification to enact a federal tax break that will cost 
state and local governments millions of dollars simply because a new industry has emerged 
into commerce"); see also id. at 25 (Dorgan minority v1ew) (noting that "[t]he beneficiaries 
of the tax break provided by this legislation will include some very significant telecommuni-
cations and computer companies"); Jane G. Grevelle & Jennifer Grevelle, How Federal 
Policymakers Account for the Concerns of State and Local Governments in the Formulation 
of Federal Tax Policy, 3 NAT'L TAX J. 631, 646 (2007) (noting that the Internet act is an 
example of the proposition that "at times, the concerns of state and local governments are 
given short shrift or apparently ignored entirely when the federal government is pursuing 
other goals, including accommodating business interests"). 
321. 47 u.s.c. § 151 (2006). 
322. See, e.g., Arizona Public Service Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979) (upholding 
Congress's ability to strike down a New Mexico tax that discriminated against the production 
of electricity within the state's borders for consumption outside the state). 
323. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. In 1995, Congress preempted state 
sales taxes imposed on the gross price of an interstate bus ticket. See ICC Termination Act of 
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 14505 (1995)). Prior to that 
law's enactment, in a dormant Commerce Clause case, the Court had upheld a state sales tax 
applied to such sales on the theory that, inter alia, the tax was fairly apportioned and not 
discriminatory within the meaning of the Commerce Clause. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jef-
ferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995). 
324. See supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text. 
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industry. Most of the recent bills being considered by Congress that would 
preempt a state tax are justified on this basis325-sometimes in cases in 
which even this purported discrimination is illusory326-and therefore the 
enactment of such bills would apparently be unauthorized under the Com-
merce Clause. However, as in the case of a state tax preemption that has 
been enacted based on Due Process concerns,327 there is some prior history 
as to these types of bills, and it is appropriate to consider what, if anything, 
this history suggests as a matter of law. 
The recently proposed federal bills seeking to preempt a discriminato-
ry state tax rely by analogy on the enactment of the "4R Act," the Railroad 
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976.328 The 4R Act prohibits 
states from taxing railroad property at a higher rate (whether by means of 
assessment practices, assessment ratios, or tax rates) than other commercial 
and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction.329 Though final-
ly passed in 1976, the Act had a long history. A comprehensive study issued 
in 1944 revealed that the states taxed interstate carriers more heavily than 
intercity transportation carriers. 330 A later comprehensive Senate report on 
national transportation policy issued in 1961 found that this pattern of taxa-
tion continued through that time. 331 Accordingly, the Senate Report recom-
mended that Congress enact legislation to address this non-uniform treat-
ment in the taxation of interstate carriers.332 Following that report numerous 
such bills were introduced and a number of hearings were held-sometimes 
solely addressed to the issue of state taxation and sometimes considering the 
issue of state taxation in the broader context of industry-wide regulation.333 
Consistent with this latter fact, the state tax component of the resulting 4R 
Act was only a small part of the Act's comprehensive railroad reform, and 
the lengthy committee reports paid only minor attention to the state tax fed-
eralism issue.334 In the aftermath of the enactment of the 4R Act, Congress 
extended its prohibition against "discriminatory" state taxation to motor 
325. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
3Z6. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
327. See supra Subsection III.A.3. 
328. 49 U.S.C. § 11501 (2006). The Act was originally codified at 49 U.S.C. § 26c 
( 1976), but was re-codified in 1978 at 49 U.S.C. § 11503 '"without substantive change,' 
§3(a), 92 Stat. 1466." CSX Trans., Inc. v. Ala. Dep't of Revenue, 131 S. Ct. 1101, 1105 n.l 
(2011). "In 1995, Congress again recodified the law without substantive change, this time at 
49 U.S. C.§ 11501." !d. 
329. 49 u.s.c. § 1150l(b). 
330. See Moore, supra note 5, at 188-89. 
331. !d. at 189. 
332. !d. 
333. !d. 
334. !d. at 189-90. 
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carriers and then air carriers. 335 In those latter cases, as in the case of the 4R 
Act, the state tax aspect of the Act was only a small part of a larger compre-
hensive regulatory reform.336 
The 4R Act and its progeny did not address state-based economic pro-
tectionism, but rather focus on "discrimination" as between industry types. 
However, perhaps significantly, Congressional regulation of the railroads 
and other means of interstate travel have a distinct and "long Constitutional 
pedigree."337 Professor Donald H. Regan has concluded that the protection 
of "interstate transportation" is one of the rare areas where the Supreme 
Court "appears to do more under the dormant Commerce Clause than mere-
ly suppress state protectionism," likely because "there is a genuine ... na-
tional interest in the existence of an effective transportation network linking 
the states" even though the "Constitution does not say that explicitly."338 
Moreover, the first major piece of Congressional legislation that generally 
resulted in conflicts with state laws was the Interstate Commerce Act of 
1887, pursuant to which Congress sought to regulate railroad rates,339 and it 
was railroad rate regulation cases decided nearly one hundred years ago that 
first convinced the Supreme Court that Congress could regulate wholly in-
trastate as well as interstate commerce.340 Therefore, while the state tax 
335. /d. at 190 (referencing section 31 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 49 USC § 
14502, and Title V of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, 49 USC § 
40116). 
336. /d. 
337. See Bork & Troy, supra note 15, at 892 (noting that "[t]he federal regulation of 
certain aspects of transportation has a long constitutional pedigree"). The railroads played an 
especially important role in the development of the country in the mid to late 1800's as they 
affected "virtually every major interest group" making "economic development of the Mid-
west possible [as well as] greatly hasten[ing] the pace of development in the eastern sea-
board, the South, and the West." See Hovenkamp, supra note 83, at 1031 (1988). 
338. Regan, supra note 56, at 1182-84. Professor Regan notes also that "[m]y sugges-
tion is that the existence of an effective transportation network is essential to genuine politi-
cal union just as the suppression of protectionism is essential to genuine political union (and 
as economic efficiency, unlimited access to potential markets, and the actual movement of 
goods are not)." /d. at 1184. Professor Regan notes state taxation as being the other area 
where the Court has seemed historically to do more than merely police state-based economic 
protectionism through the concept of "fair apportionment." !d. at 1185-86; see supra notes 
291-93 and accompanying text. 
339. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). 
340. See Ely, supra note 83, at 969-73 (evaluating judicial developments leading up 
to the Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913) and Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 
(1914), where the Court made clear that Congress could legislate with respect to intrastate 
railroad rates when such a step was deemed necessary for control of interstate commerce); 
see also Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (noting, "Congress is empowered 
to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in 
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities."). The 
broader significance of the decision notwithstanding, the Shreveport Rate Cases were a situa-
tion where Congress did not preempt the state tax at issue but rather merely eliminated the 
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preemption included within the 4R Act may not be consistent with the pur-
pose or text of the Commerce Clause, the thrust of that law, including the 
state tax preemption therein, is at least consistent with the historic applica-
tion of the Clause.341 
Previously, in the discussion of state tax preemptions that derive from 
Due Process considerations-also circumstances that are not squarely root-
ed in the purpose or text of the Commerce Clause-this Article posited that 
an appropriate analytic approach might be to evaluate the "congruence and 
proportionality" of the Congressional Act vis-a-vis its asserted basis in the 
Constitution.342 This approach can be extended to preemptive legislation that 
addresses more distinctly Commerce Clause-as opposed to Due Process-
concerns, in the interest of safe-guarding the states' sovereign right of taxa-
tion. Applying this approach to the 4R Act, one finds that the Act is argua-
bly congruent with a valid Constitutional aim, i.e., the historic action under 
the Commerce Clause to protect a means of interstate travel and shipment. 
However, the Act's proportionality to this purpose is more questionable 
because the scope of the statute is generally ambiguous-a fact that has 
resulted in significant litigation-and, further, certain actions under the law 
can be brought in federal, as opposed to state, court. 343 On the other hand, in 
its favor, the 4R Act is not an outright preemption of state tax, but rather an 
attempt-however imperfect-to equalize the state tax to be applied to in-
terstate carriers relative to other in-state businesses in cases in which the 
Act is implicated.344 
discriminatory aspect of the tax, consistent with the purposes that underlie the Commerce 
Clause. See Ely, supra note 83, at 971 (noting with respect to the Texas rate-making that was 
addressed by the case that "[t]he Texas Commission made no secret of its desire to foster 
economic development within the state" and that "[t]he result of its rate scheme was to aid 
Dallas and Houston at the expense of Shreveport"); see also supra notes 195-96 and the 
accompanying text. 
341. Cf Arizona v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co., 656 F.2d 398, 407 (9th 
Cir. 1981) (upholding the 4R Act against a Commerce Clause challenge since "the legitimate 
end" of the Act was to "revitalize the nation's railroads to improve the flow of interstate 
commerce" and the means adopted, "prohibiting states from assessing railroad property at 
higher ratios than other commercial and industrial property," was "'plainly adapted to that 
end"). ' ' 
342. See supra notes 300-13 and accompanying text. 
343. For example, there has been decades of litigation "over the identification of 
which commercial and industrial property taxes constitute[] the comparison class for rail-
roads, the jurisdiction and role of the federal courts, what taxes besides property taxes [are] 
included and how to deal with exempt property." FED. TAX ADMINISTRATORS RES. 2010-3, 
FED. PREEMPTION OF STATE PROPERTY TAX AUTHORITY, available at http://www.taxadmin. 
org/fta/meet/11arn/2011_resolutions.pdf. 
344. In this latter respect, the Act is similar to Congress's legislative action as upheld 
by the Court in Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); see supra note 340. 
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In contrast to the analysis with respect to the 4R Act, the recently pro-
posed federal bills that attempt to analogize to that Ad45 are not congruent 
to an appropriate Commerce Clause goal, as the mere fact that two indus-
tries are being taxed differently (while the interstate and in-state actors with-
in the state are taxed uniformly) does not--certainly without more-raise 
constitutional concerns. When the congruence standard is not met, applica-
tion of the proportionality standard is not necessary. However, assuming 
that the affected industries supporting the proposed federal bills could assert 
some valid constitutional basis for these bills-justifying why they should 
not be taxed less favorably than some other industry, where there was in 
fact some discrepancy-the appropriate proportionality would apparently be 
to eliminate, not the entire tax, but merely the differential. 
CONCLUSION 
Analysis of the U.S. Constitution and concerns about federalism have 
recently found their way from U.S. Supreme Court precedent into the public 
consciousness, as reflected in the debate about the constitutionality of the 
recently-enacted federal health care bill. But at the same time Congressional 
attempts to preempt state taxes have become more prevalent and in some 
cases successful, in part because there are no stated judicial rules that spe-
cifically impose limitations on such federal preemptions. The absence of 
such rules means not only that there are no obvious practical impediments 
to such Congressional actions, it suggests that Congress has virtually unlim-
ited capacity to preempt state taxes, whether or not it chooses to exercise 
this power. That mindset is reflected in much of the academic literature-
what little there is-and also the legislative debate. 
Despite the legal history and the prevalent legal thinking, a common 
sense evaluation of the dual sovereignty system established by the Constitu-
tion's Framers suggests that the U.S. Constitution does impose implicit 
limitations as to a proposed Congressional attempt to preempt a state tax, 
pursuant to which most of the recently proposed state tax preemptions 
would likely be unconstitutional upon passage. Federal legislators should 
act with this understanding, in appreciation of the importance of the U.S. 
Constitution's structural framework and the considerable benefits that de-
rive from our nation's system of dual sovereignty. In addition, hopefully in· 
the near future the Supreme Court will clarify the rightful protective limita-
tions to be imposed with respect to the Congressional preemption of a state 
tax. 
345. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
